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

LITTERAE MENTIS

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Editorial

Welcome to the fourth issue of *Litterae Mentis: A Journal of Literary Studies*, the University of Kent's postgraduate journal of literary criticism. Driven and edited by postgraduates in the School of English (and funded by the School), *Litterae Mentis* provides a platform for MA and PhD students to publish new, exciting papers examining literature of any period. The aim of the journal is to encourage original research from fresh academic voices, reflecting the diverse interests of Kent's thriving academic community.

As suggested by its name, *Litterae Mentis* is devoted to manifestations of the mind in literature. The journal invites a richly interdisciplinary criticism that concerns itself with the points of connection between literary studies and philosophy, sociology, psychology, history and other fields. This issue's theme of 'absence' has produced a selection of very different papers examining the ways in which lack or effacement are represented in a number of texts, stretching from the Middle Ages to the present. As Dr Declan Gilmore-Kavanagh suggests in his introduction, absence can become uncomfortably present, and it is this paradox that shapes the essays collected here. Each writer has confronted the subtle, and sometimes the obvious, absences that figure in the texts we read — drawing out the complex, often contradictory, implications of what is made present and what is kept absent.

We have found the process of compiling this journal incredibly rewarding and feel privileged to have had the opportunity to work with such engaged and enthusiastic individuals. We hope that the articles collected here nuance your

understanding of absence and suggest new ways of reading the shadows it casts over the demands of the present.

Finally, we would like to extend our thanks to the staff at the School of English for their support in the production of this year's journal, with special acknowledgements to Dr Gilmore-Kavanagh for his tender and thoughtful introduction and to Prof Richardson, Dr March-Russell, Dr Cregan-Reid and Dr Abu-Manneh for their insightful peer-reviews. We would also like to thank our fantastic contributors: without their creative ideas and hard work this issue would not exist.

The Litterae Mentis Editorial Team 2017

Introduction

On Absence

Dr Declan Gilmore-Kavanagh

What is absence? I've been thinking about this very question as I read through each of the brilliant essays contained in this collection. We only come to know absence through our intimate memory of an object's, or person's, or animal's, or place's, or thing's, *presence*. To be absent to someone is to be remembered by someone; it is to be brought imaginatively and psychically into presence, however intangible such presence might be. When I think of *absence* I think immediately of frustration: the frustrations of others, and my own frustration, at the many absences in my own life: friends, lovers, the dead. Often there is a definite sadness intermingled with one's experience of absence. For me, it is the kind of sadness that is always there; it is part of the bargain of memory. Through the instabilities of memory we can bring into focus an absence; the space that holds this absence is often riveted together by the force of our longing. It is tempting to think about the ways that we imaginatively conjure *absence* into *presence*, as being inextricably tied to the process of mourning.

To feel absence is to mourn. I recognise this, yet, at the same time, I am prompted to recall the joy that can be found in those periods of temporary separation from an object, or even, from a lover. I am thinking of the pleasures of solitude. I am thinking of the ways in which absence can form a constructive space. If we absent ourselves we find ourselves. Sometimes this self can be unbearable. Sometimes the recognition of it gives us the presence we need. An absence of an object, a person, an

animal, a place, a thing, can be affirming. Absence can sometimes be a triumph it seems, but only if we have agency in its making. When we return to enter into the presence of the absent person, or place, or thing, we return to something modified, changed, imprinted by our own absence. Absence is subjective and it is many things: it is many people, animals, places, objects, and pleasures. Our relationship to it defines us. Imagine the world without you in it. To do so is to immediately imagine inexpressible loss; it is also to imagine unrealised potentialities. Certainly, it would be a different, and more impoverished, world. Absence, we might say, is about world-making.

In thinking about literary studies, reading these particular essays prompted me to re-consider the relationship that exists between reading and absence. Two questions immediately came to mind: (1) What kind of risks, if any, do we take, when we read absent-mindedly? (2) What if reading is always, in some fundamental sense, about a search for absence? The four essays in this accomplished collection bring absent worlds, and potentialities, sharply into focus. The first, 'Abduction and Exile: The Twin Absences of *Sir Orfeo*' by Angana Moitra, is a beautifully written essay which examines absence in medieval romance narratives. Moitra focuses on how the tropes of exile and abduction are deployed as a narrative strategy in romance plots, which ensured 'an enforced isolation through which the protagonist must battle not only the horrors of a hostile, foreign environment but also the mental torments unleashed by his inner demons' (10). Crucially, as Moitra argues, these tropes of exile and abduction focus on 'the fact of *absence*' (10). One of the key strengths of this piece centres on Moitra's careful examination of absence as it relates to both abduction and exile in *Sir Orfeo*, which demonstrates how

> [t]he motif of abduction enacts an involuntary absence on the part of the character abducted, often through coercion and force, whereas the trope of exile enacts either an obligatory absence decreed by a higher authority, or in some cases, a voluntary absence willingly undertaken by the protagonist in order to come to terms with himself and his circumstances. (11)

In this way, Moitra addresses the politics of absence from a range of positions as represented upon the terrain of medieval literary cultures. Absence, in the context of medieval romance narratives, becomes 'the yarn which is used to spin the narrative cloth' (25).

Emmie Shand's rich essay, 'Unmarriageable Women: Renegotiating the Feminine in Michel Faber's *The Crimson Petal and the White* and Wilkie Collins' *The Woman in White*', explores the way in which the female body is absented in Victorian and Neo-Victorian literatures. Demonstrating how the marriage plot often re-inscribes traditional notions of Victorian femininity, Shand explores how both authors — Faber and Collins —

> interrogate women's position in Victorian marriages more successfully through an alternative figure — not the unmarried woman, a term suggestive of the negatively connoted 'spinster', but from the perspective of the unmarriageable woman. (29)

In doing so, Shand's essay makes visible the absence of the "unmarriageable woman", prompting us to re-consider our reading of femininities in Victorian and Neo-Victorian literature and culture.

Claire Margerison's excellent essay, 'Sentience and Sentimentality: The Problem of Being Without Body in Late Twentieth-Century Science Fiction', takes examples from a range of late twentieth-century texts to show how the originators of science fiction were 'actively looking at the relationship between humans and machines and questioning the extent to which the human mind and body were separate entities' (63). Through intricate readings of a number of texts, which draw upon rich theoretical explorations of technology and the limitations of the human self, Margerison brings into sharp relief the absent human

body in portrayals of artificial intelligence. This essay traverses some interesting terrain in its exploration of the philosophical and moral questions that arise when the mind is separated from the materiality of the flesh. Most of all, Margerison's essay prompted me to re-consider how the old dualism of mind and body remains central to exclusionary formations of the category of "the human".

Finally, Angelina Lesniewski's fine essay, 'It is a Sin to Start a Family: Motherhood and Radicalism in Revolutionary Russia', takes the absence of accounts of mothering — and the maternal — within Russian revolutionary women's writings as its subject. Demonstrating how the female political subject is expected to renounce the traditionally feminine roles of mother and dutiful wife in order to gain her radical agency, Lesniewski's essay reads maternal absence in texts by revolutionary women. She also astutely notes the inherent difficulty in reading for absent children, as 'it is the words themselves which may have served to downplay the role and importance of children on women's political decisions' (69). Lesniewski's essay reminds me that the very act of reading an archive announces our scholarly search for absence. One of the major achievements of this essay is the convincing ways in which its author showcases how women in the Russian revolutionary movement were often forced to confront the reality that 'to be a mother and a revolutionary required vastly disparate lifestyles, and the absence caused by one invariably hurt the other' (85). Reading this essay, I am reminded that absence can pull us apart as much as it can bring us together.

The four essays in this collection offer readers a real treat. The topics broached by each contributor span a vast period that deftly moves from the medieval to the contemporary. Issues of gender and technology are given robust treatment, whilst the organising theme of absence renders this impressive collection present.

Abduction and Exile: The Twin Absences of *Sir Orfeo*

Angana Moitra

Romance narratives in the Middle Ages were typically structured around a climactic episode, enacted through such motifs as the imposition of a challenge to the hero which he is required to successfully complete within a limited amount of time: the quest to retrieve a prized object which has been stolen or lost or the search to bring back a character close to the hero who has been abducted by people or forces inimical to the protagonist. Incidents such as these were stock narratological devices available in the romance author's arsenal and required positive expiation on the part of the hero in order to engineer a harmonious resolution. Intended as a test both of the hero's physical prowess as well as his mental fortitude, the central problematic of the romance plot precipitates a series of crises with which the protagonist must grapple before he is able to embark upon the ultimate journey from which he will return triumphant.[1] One of the narrative strategies employed in romance plots to thematise these crises was the trope of exile. By physically removing the hero from his community and familiar surroundings, the motif of exile ensures an enforced isolation in which the protagonist must battle not only the horrors of a hostile, foreign environment, but also the mental torments unleashed by his inner demons. The rigours of exile would, by compelling him to overcome barriers both external and internal, set him on the path to success. The tropes of exile and abduction, however, crucially centre on the fact of *absence*.

The motif of abduction enacts an involuntary absence on the part of the character abducted, often through coercion and force, whereas the trope of exile enacts either an obligatory absence decreed by a higher authority or, in some cases, a voluntary absence willingly undertaken by the protagonist in order to come to terms with himself and his circumstances. In this paper, I wish to explore the interplay of the two narrative strategies of exile and abduction through an examination of their use in the fourteenth-century romance *Sir Orfeo*.

Sir Orfeo is a medieval retelling in verse of the Greek myth of Orpheus and is extant in three manuscripts — the Auchinleck, the Harley, and the Ashmole — of which the version contained in the Auchinleck MS (compiled around 1330, while the Harley and the Ashmole date from around the beginning and end of the fifteenth century respectively) appears to be both the earliest and the most complete.[2] The source of the poem seems to be an Anglo-Norman or Old-French translation of a (now lost) Breton *lai* of Orpheus, references to the existence of which have been found in *Floire et Blanceflor*, the *Prose Lancelot*, and the *Lai de l'Espine*. The Breton *lais* were short narrative poems composed in the Breton language. Though lost to us now, they are believed to have related, through lyrical arrangement and musical accompaniment, the heroic exploits (*aventures*) of the men of Brittany. Performed by bards and jongleurs, Breton *lais* typically drew upon native (particularly Celtic) mythology as well as classical legend for their subject matter.

The narrative trajectory of *Sir Orfeo* is simple: Orfeo is the king of Winchester and his court is presented as an idyllic political landscape where both ruler and ruled, lord and subject are united by bonds of harmony, concord, and felicity. The happiness of the kingdom, however, is marred by a personal tragedy when Orfeo's beloved wife Heurodis is abducted on a balmy May morning by the tyrannous and diabolical King of the Fairies. Heartbroken at the loss of his queen, an inconsolable Orfeo withdraws from society and exiles himself to the woods

where he spends ten years in a state of penitent contrition. One morning, Orfeo comes across a lavish hunting party and is astonished to find Heurodis as part of the company. Determined to ascertain the whereabouts of his kidnapped wife, he follows the group through an opening in the hillside to discover that he has entered Fairyland, the nefarious domain of the Fairy King. The realm's glittering exterior seems to belie an unsettling and horrifying reality. Adopting the disguise of a minstrel, Orfeo is granted access to the Fairy King's palace where he surveys with mute horror the gallery of the Fairy King's former victims, a grisly exhibition of tortured bodies in suspended animation. Upon meeting the Fairy King, Orfeo proffers to entertain him with the music of his harp, and when the king, well-pleased with Orfeo's musical artistry, asks him what he would like as his reward, Orfeo requests that his wife be returned to him. The Fairy King reluctantly agrees, and Orfeo returns with Heurodis to Winchester where, following Orfeo's test of the fidelity of the steward upon whom he had entrusted the administration of his kingdom during his exile, the conventional happy ending of the romance takes place as the English court celebrates the homecoming of its king and queen.

Before I begin with an analysis of the poem, it is probably expedient to provide a brief overview of the *Orfeo*-poet's primary sources for the Orpheus legend in order to better comprehend and appreciate the changes he wrought to his subject matter. The Middle Ages received the story of Orpheus through the reworking of the myth by the Augustan poets Virgil and Ovid and subsequently through Boethius' philosophical reformulation of the tale in the sixth century CE. In the version related by Virgil in Book IV of the *Georgics*, Eurydice dies after being bitten by a snake as she flees from the predatory pursuit of Aristaeus, a pastoral demi-god. In Ovid (who narrates the story in Book X of the *Metamorphoses*), the figure of Aristaeus is absent, and Eurydice dies of a snakebite as she is strolling through the garden on her wedding day. It is important to note that in the work of both Latin poets, there is no question of

Orpheus' successful return. Having descended to the Underworld and appeased the lord Pluto through the force of his plaintive lament for his lost wife, Orpheus manages to negotiate a deal with Pluto by which Eurydice is returned to him on the condition that he should not look back while exiting the gates of Hell. Orpheus, however, fails to stick to his side of the bargain; propelled by love and anxious concern, he looks back to reaffirm the presence of Eurydice who had been trailing behind him and loses her, forever and irretrievably, to the shadows of the nether regions. In his treatment of the tale in Book III of *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Boethius offered a didactic reinterpretation of the myth by which Orpheus became a metaphor for the human soul and Eurydice was made to represent concupiscence. The wider moral of the Orpheus legend, according to Boethius, seems to be that minds, once kindled to divine excellence, should not look back upon the inferior and the ignoble since to do so is to renounce all happiness and prosperity. The *Orfeo*-poet has adopted the classical story of Orpheus as presented by Virgil, Ovid and Boethius, and reshaped it in new and interesting ways: the pagan universe of the original legend has been supplemented by a quintessentially Celtic apparatus of fairy mythology, Orpheus' kingdom has been transposed to the explicitly English milieu of medieval Winchester, and the entire tale has been subtly suffused with the shimmering grace of the poet's Christian consciousness. The most significant transformation is clearly evident in Orfeo's successful retrieval of Heurodis from the Fairy King's realm, an event which furnishes the resolution of the central crisis and helps to draw the narrative to a harmonious close. With this change, the *Orfeo*-poet eliminated the tragic tenor of the classical legend — a strain which often bordered on a kind of pathetic sentimentality — in favour of a positive conclusion which allied his work more firmly with the expected happy endings typical of romances. Among the many innovative techniques utilised by the *Orfeo*-poet is his handling of the theme of absence, an idea which runs like a leitmotif throughout the narrative. Unlike the classical myth, where

absence spurs the protagonist on to immediate action, in *Sir Orfeo* absence engenders further absence, a thematic doubling which is embodied through the tropes of abduction and exile. As cogs crucial to the turning of the narrative machinery, each of these tropes merits greater critical attention.

The abduction of Heurodis by the Fairy King functions as the critical turning point of the narrative, a catastrophic act which not only marks a point of high dramatic intensity, but also triggers and determines all future action. Patrizia Grimaldi describes it as a 'function' which is 'extremely important, since by means of it, the actual movement of the tale is created'.[3] The kidnapping of the queen appears unmotivated and arbitrary, although it is presaged by Heurodis' forewarning about her impending ravishment to Orfeo and his knights. When Heurodis falls asleep in the shade of a grafted tree in her orchard, she is visited by the Fairy King (presumably in a dream, although the narrative does not specify) who forces her to take a brief tour of his expansive kingdom in Fairyland before letting her off with the warning that she must yield herself to him on the morrow or suffer the consequences:

> "Loke, dame, to-morwe þatow be
> Riȝt here vnder þis ympe-tre,
> & þan þou schalt wiþ ous go,
> & liue wiþ ous euer-mo;
> & ȝif þou makest ous y-let,
> Whar þou be, þou worst y-fet,
> & to-tore þine limes al,
> þat noþing help þe no schal;
> & þei þou best so to-torn,
> Ȝete þou worst wiþ ous y-born."
> (165–174)

> "Look, lady, tomorrow you will be right under this grafted tree and then you shall go with us and live with us evermore. And if you hinder our purpose,

wherever you may be, you shall be fetched by force and your limbs torn — nothing will help you, and though you so be so injured, you shall nonetheless be borne away with us."[4]

The violence explicit in the Fairy King's threat to Heurodis is given visceral embodiment in her disfiguration and self-mutilation upon regaining consciousness:

Ac, as sone as sche gan awake,
Sche crid, & loþli bere gan make:
Sche froted hir honden & hir fet,
& crached hir visage — it bled wete;
Hir riche robe hye al to-rett,
& was reueyd out of her witt.
(77–82)

But as soon as she had awoken, she cried and in a loathsome way began to rub her hands and feet, and scratched her face until it began to bleed. She tore her rich robe to pieces and was driven out of her wits.

Corinne Saunders has perceptively pointed out that both the psychological ravishment of Heurodis and her actual kidnapping are suggestive of rape, playing as they do upon the dual connotations of mental and physical abduction implied by the etymological root 'raptus'.[5] As a specific instance of male aggression and brute assertion of power, the act is also comparable to rape in its categorical and absolute denial of female agency. The possibilities of reading Heurodis' abduction as analogous to rape become stronger when we bear in mind two different but related episodes from classical myth — Pluto's lust-inflamed abduction of Proserpina as well as Aristaeus' voyeuristic stalking of Eurydice in Virgil's *Georgics*. The final act of abduction, while not entirely unexpected, is nevertheless

effected with a suddenness and force that renders all of Orfeo's military preparations useless:

Amorwe þe vnder-tide is come,
& Orfeo haþ his armes y-nome,
& wele ten hundred kniȝtes wiþ him,
Ich y-armed, stout & grim;
& wiþ þe quen wenten he
Riȝt vnto þat ympe-tre.
Þai made a scheltrom in ich a side,
& sayd þai wold þere abide
& dye þer euerichon,
Er þe quen schuld fram hem gone;
Ac ȝete amiddes hem ful riȝt
Þe quen was oway y-tviȝt,
Wiþ fairi forþ y-nome
— Men wist neuer wher sche was bicome.
(181–194)

At noon on the following day, Orfeo took his arms and a thousand knights with him, all well-armed, stout, and grim, and followed the queen to the grafted tree. They made a defensive formation with a rank of men on each side and claimed that they would not stir from their positions, preferring to die before the queen should be taken from them. And yet in the midst of them all, the queen was snatched away by the fairies — none of the men knew where she had gone.

The economy of expression is admirable. The abduction of Heurodis is a decisive event, one which shapes the trajectory of the romance narrative. It occasions an absence which is both literal and symbolic: Heurodis is physically separated from her husband, and without her presence Orfeo is left emotionally barren. Orfeo is compelled to grapple not simply with an external corporeal absence — Heurodis is no longer bodily

present — but also with an internal psychological absence — the deprivation of spousal love, companionate comfort, and conjugal happiness. Absence, both of individuals as well as material objects and personal possessions, is a frequent thematic preoccupation of romances, usually providing the impetus for the quest the hero must undertake to redress the situation and which typically constitutes the central thrust of the narrative. However, it is significant that no such quest is undertaken in *Sir Orfeo*; in fact, Orfeo's response to Heurodis' absence is to absent himself from the secular world of the court and its community in a sort of self-banishment. In this romance, the act of abduction is significant only insofar as it functions as an enabling factor — by inaugurating the subsequent act of Orfeo's exile, the trope of abduction acts as a catalyst, aiding the chemical reaction which is effected through Orfeo's sojourn in the forest. It is to an examination of this motif of greater narrative importance, as well as dramatic intensity, that we now turn.

Orfeo's self-imposed exile is of vital importance since it serves as a preparatory interlude before the poet can initiate the final chain of events which will culminate in Orfeo's successful recovery of Heurodis. This voluntary abdication is directly provoked by the abduction of Heurodis, and although it is an immediate reaction, it is nonetheless well thought-out. Orfeo will quit his kingdom to live the life of a hermit, but not before he has made arrangements to ensure the smooth functioning of the court in his absence:

> He cleped to-gider his barouns,
> Erls, lordes of renouns,
> & when þai al y-comen were,
> "Lordinges," he said, "Bifor 3ou here
> Ich ordainy min hei3e steward
> To wite mi kingdom afterward;
> In mi stede ben he schal
> To kepe mi londes ouer-al,
> For now ichaue mi quen y-lore,

> Þe fairest leuedi þat euer was bore,
> Neuer eft y nil no woman se.
> In-to wilderness ichil te,
> & liue þer euermore
> Wiþ wilde bestes in holtes hore;
> & when 3e vnder-stond þat y be spent,
> Make 3ou þan a parlement,
> & chese 3ou a newe king
> — Now doþ 3our best wiþ al mi þinge."
> (201-218)

> He called together his barons, earls, and lords of renown, and when they had all gathered, he said, "Lords, before you here I ordain my steward to rule the kingdom in my absence; in my place he shall administer all the lands, for now that I have lost my queen, the fairest lady that ever was born, I shall never again see another woman. I will go to the wilderness and live there evermore with the wild beasts in the grey woods, and when you understand that I have passed away, summon a parliament and choose a new king — now do the best you can with all my possessions."

While it is certainly true that unlike the conventional knightly hero of romance, Orfeo does not embark upon a quest to seek Heurodis, choosing the life of a pariah instead, it is nevertheless important to note that this decision is not imposed, but very clearly self-willed. Calling the narrative arc featuring Orfeo's exile the "subplot", Mary Hynes-Berry has argued in favour of reading Orfeo's autonomy in a positive light and the motif of exile as the pivotal arena where negative determination — seeking to prevent Heurodis' abduction through military fortification, surrendering the kingdom to the hands of his appointed delegate — turns to positive resolution — Orfeo's decision to follow the hunting party — which eventually leads to restoration.[6] While I do not necessarily agree with Hynes-Berry

in her delineation of exile as a subplot (I see the poetic plot as a unified, seamless whole, moving from one episode to another with a limpid flow which does not quite admit plot divisions), I do believe that exile functions within this romance as a critical playing field where the central tensions of the narrative are negotiated.

Exile, writes Robert Edwards, 'means separation, banishment, withdrawal, expatriation, and displacement; its emotional expression is loss, usually manifested as sorrow, sometimes as nostalgia'; it is a break 'not simply with space or location but with the cultural and social continuities of place and with a collective history'.[7] The reality of exile was often encountered in the classical world, where it was a part of the civic emphasis of a republican state, a kind of imperial adjudication to punish transgressors and dissidents. Within the purview of Christian thought, however, exile took on a more spiritual significance. The scriptural imagination refashioned exile from a legal edict issued by royal authority to an interiorised condition of being, a state of mind associated with the denial of the self and the rewards of renunciation promised by Christ to his disciples. Viewed this way, exile can be an act of volition, consciously chosen and deliberately adopted; as Edwards remarks, 'Exile can also involve withdrawal as a means to gain or learn something, and such retreat is often the prelude to change.'[8] The motif of exile also played a prominent part in the literature of Anglo-Saxon England, a literature which, perhaps by virtue of being produced in an insular environment geographically separated from continental Europe, frequently dealt with themes of loss, abandonment, mutability, and transience.[9] The trope filtered into later English tradition and was frequently utilised in romance. Diane Speed observes:

> The most common narrative base of medieval romance [is] the exile-and-return, or its variation, the chivalric quest. For a limited time the hero undergoes displacement from his home and the security of self-definition in relation to familiar

> circumstances, and his society experiences corresponding loss or diminution. In unfamiliar territory, which is testing or threatening, he goes through a process of learning and maturing. His eventual restoration at the end of that process marks a return to order for himself and his society and usually for both an improved security based in an expectation of no worse than natural death, together with perpetuation of the dynasty and eternal salvation of the pious individual.[10]

It is within this sociocultural and literary context that Orfeo's exile should be read.

The *Orfeo*-poet provides a poignant description of the rigours of exile, employing a combination of repetition and contrast to highlight the drastic change in Orfeo's fortunes, an account which is all the more moving in view of the fact that this is an experience not inevitable but entirely discretionary. Orfeo's exilic state is marked throughout by absence, not only of marital companionship and the sense of *communitas* which binds society together, but also of past comforts and the luxuries of royal living. His only link to his former existence is through a material object, the harp, an instrument he is particularly adept at playing. It is worth quoting the passage describing the privations of Orfeo's exile in full:

> Þurth wode & ouer heþ
> In-to þe wildernes he geþ.
> Noþing he fint þat him is ays,
> Bot euer he liueþ in gret malais.
> He þat hadde y-werd þe fowe & griis,
> & on bed þe purper biis
> — Now on hard heþe he liþ,
> Wiþ leues & grasse he him wriþ.
> He þat hadde had castels & tours,
> Riuer, forest, friþ wiþ flours
> — Now, þei it comenci to snewe & frees,

Þis king mot make his bed in mese.
He þat had y-had kniȝtes of priis
Bifor him kneland, & leuedis
— Now seþ he no-þing þat him likeþ,
Bot wilde wormes bi him strikeþ.
He þat had y-had plenté
Of mete & drink, of ich deynté
— Now may he al-day digge & wrote
Er he finde his fille of rote.
In somer he liueþ bi wild frut,
& berien bot gode lite;
In winter may he no-þing finde
Bot rote, grases, & þe rinde.
Al his bodi was oway duine
For missays, and al to-chine.
Lord! who may telle þe sore
Þis king sufferd ten ȝere & more?
His here of his berd, blac & rowe,
To his girdle-stede was growe.
His harp, where-on was al his gle,
He hidde in an holwe tre,
& when þe weder was clere & briȝt
He toke his harp to him wel riȝt
& harped at his owhen wille.
In-to alle þe wode þe soun gan schille,
Þat alle þe wilde bestes þat þer beþ
For ioie abouten him þai teþ,
& alle þe foules þat þer were
Come & sete on ich a brere,
To here his harping a-fine
— So miche melody was þer-in;
& when he his harping lete wold,
No best bi him abide nold.
(237–280)

Through wood and over heath he went into the wilderness. He did not find anything to

comfort him but lived in great malaise. He who had worn variegated furs and lain on beds of fine purple linen, now lay on hard ground wrapped only in grass and leaves. He who had had castles and towers, rivers, forests, and woodlands with flowers in bloom, now made his bed on moss when it began to snow and the ground to freeze. He who had had knights of renown kneeling before him and ladies of worth, now found nothing of value except wild worms which crawled about him. He who had had food and drink in plenty would now dig and grub all day before he could find his fill of wild root. In the summer he lived on wild fruits and a few berries, but in winter he would find nothing except roots, grass, and husk. His body began to waste away from the discomfort and he was shrivelled and broken. Lord! Who may tell the misfortunes this king suffered for ten years and more? The hair of his beard, black and rough, had grown to his girdle. His harp, on which was bestowed all his happiness and glee, was sheltered in the hollow of a tree, and when the weather was clear and bright, he took his harp and played it at his own will. The sound would resound shrilly throughout the woods, and all the beasts would approach him in joy and all the birds would nestle on the branches and twigs to hear his harping — such melody was there in it. And when he would cease harping, no beast would abide by him.

The severity of his contrition is almost monastic, based as it is on the total abnegation of the indulgences of monarchical existence. The trope of self-exile is not an invention of the *Orfeo*-poet; the classical Orpheus too had consigned himself to the woods to mourn the loss of Eurydice following his jeopardising of the pact entered into with the lord of the Underworld. The

artistic achievement of the *Orfeo*-poet lies in the fact that, unlike his classical forbears, he has transposed Orfeo's exile to the period of time *prior* to the rescue of Heurodis, a strategy probably borrowed from the Orpheus episode related by King Alfred in his Anglo-Saxon translation of Boethius' *Consolation*.[11] The Biblical echoes apparent in the passage are not merely fortuitous, but were probably deliberately crafted into the narrative. The pagan Orpheus, for instance, had often been compared with Christ by virtue of his peaceful nature, his power to bring harmony and concord through music and eloquence, as well as by his tragic death at the hands of his followers.[12] The harp, in view of its divine associations as an instrument of celebration, deification, as well as penance, allied Orpheus with the figures of David and Apollo.[13] The wildness of Orfeo's appearance in exile, together with the intractable and hostile nature of his surroundings, is also reminiscent of early Christian legends of the hairy anchorite.[14] The forest itself becomes symbolic of the eremitic tradition, recalling the penitence of Nebuchadnezzar.[15]

The eschatological parallels are not simply gratuitous embellishments designed to exhibit the breadth of the poet's scriptural knowledge but serve to underscore a vital point. By presenting Orfeo in terms paralleling the sufferings of Christian saints, hermits, and martyrs, the poet seems to suggest that Orfeo too undergoes a kind of spiritual purification akin to those of his ecclesiastical counterparts. Kenneth Gros Louis succinctly observes:

> During his ten years in the wilderness, Orfeo learns the greater value of another kind of power, another kind of wealth. By humbly abandoning his material pleasures and donning the mantle of a pilgrim, Orfeo indicates his acceptance of the loss of Heurodis and his recognition of the proper role of man on earth. At the same time, however, his sacrifice for Heurodis, for which he expects neither praise nor reward, asserts to the universe the

> dignity of man and the strength of man's love — love based not on passion, but on charity.[16]

It is this resigned acceptance of his fate together with the drive to cast off all material attachment that allows Orfeo to succeed where his classical progenitor had failed. In flouting the decree of the gods, Orpheus had displayed both inconstancy and immoderate emotion, excesses which condemned him to failure; Orfeo, by contrast, not only embraced his lot but also embarked upon a programme of personal and spiritual amelioration by relinquishing the material trappings of secular existence. It is, however, the trope of absence which both provokes and characterises Orfeo's exile. It is the lack, not only of his wife's bodily presence, but also what she represents for him — love, comfort, and belongingness — that motivates Orfeo to withdraw from his kingdom at Winchester. In Heurodis' absence, kingship appears superfluous and royal existence ceases to have any meaning. Orfeo's exile too is characterised by absence, by the lack of all things both material and abstract which marked his former life. This is an absence which has manifold significances and which operates at multiple levels — in his state of self-willed expulsion, Orfeo physically strips himself of royal finery, renounces all the appurtenances of monarchical rule, and isolates himself from civilisation. He refuses to be mired within the illusory world of sensory pleasure and earthly splendour, choosing atonement through repudiation and self-abasement. His unconditional and voluntary surrender to forces both divine and natural earn him the reward of grace as he is finally allowed, in what is surely intended to be read as an act of heavenly dispensation, to view Heurodis and thereby undertake the journey which concludes in her successful recovery and their mutual return.

The abduction of Heurodis and the exile of Orfeo are two fundamentally important episodes within the narrative of the poem, precipitating as well as contouring the chain of events which comprise the dramatic action. The two incidents follow a

similar structuring pattern: both are prefaced with a statement of intent (Heurodis tells Orfeo that she must leave with the Fairy King and Orfeo tells his subjects that he must depart from the kingdom), both remain adamant in the face of sincere, grief-stricken pleas to remain, both events are followed by detailed descriptions of the sorrow entailed and the mournful repercussions as a consequence of the action.[17] It is the motif of absence, however, which thematically unites the two episodes; it is the yarn which is used to spin the narrative cloth. Both abduction and exile share an absence which is binary in aspect, at once physical and symbolic — Heurodis' abduction leads not only to her physical absence but also to an absence of the conjugal comfort and stability she represents for Orfeo; similarly, Orfeo's exile not only isolates him corporeally from his court but also metaphorically from all the trimmings and accessories of regal life. The trope is enacted through a double loss — Orfeo loses his wife and Winchester loses its king — a strategic twinning which is resolved through a double restoration — Heurodis is returned to her husband and the royal pair return to the English court. By setting up such a series of dualities and parallels, the *Orfeo*-poet constructs a narrative which is full of symmetry and balance, proportion and equipoise, and this is what contributes to the poem's artistic strength.

Notes

[1] For a brief discussion of the standard literary motifs employed by romance authors, see Corinne Saunders' introduction in *A Companion to Romance: From Classical to Contemporary*, ed. by Corinne Saunders (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 1–4, and Erich Auerbach, 'The Knight Sets Forth,' in *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 123–142.

[2] For a detailed summary of the provenance and sources of the poem, see A. J. Bliss' introduction in *Sir Orfeo*, ed. by A. J. Bliss, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. ix–xli.

[3] Patrizia Grimaldi, '*Sir Orfeo* as Celtic Folk-Hero, Christian Pilgrim, and Medieval King'. *Allegory, Myth, and Symbol*, ed. by Morton W. Bloomfield (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 149.

[4] Bliss, p. 16. All subsequent references to the poem are to this edition by line number. All quotations are from the version preserved in the Auchinleck MS. All translations of quoted excerpts are my own. I have not aimed at an exact poetic translation, preferring to loosely convey the sense of the words instead.

[5] See Corinne Saunders' *Rape and Ravishment in the Literature of Medieval England* (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2001), pp. 228–233.

[6] Mary Hynes-Berry, 'Cohesion in *King Horn* and *Sir Orfeo*'. *Speculum* 50 (1975): 652–670 (p. 664).

[7] Robert Edwards, 'Exile, Self, and Society'. *Exile in Literature*, ed. by María-Inés Lagos-Pope (London: Associated University Presses, 1988), pp. 15–16.

[8] Ibid., p. 18.

[9] For a discussion of Anglo-Saxon attitudes towards their own insularity, see Daniel Anlezark, 'The Anglo-Saxon world view', pp. 66–81, and Christine Fell, 'Perceptions of transience', pp. 180–197, both in *The Cambridge Companion to Old English Literature*, ed. by Malcolm Godden and Michael Lapidge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[10] Diane Speed quoted in Rosalind Field, 'The King Over the Water: Exile-and-Return Revisited'. *Cultural Encounters in the Romance of Medieval England*, ed. by Corinne Saunders (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2005), p. 42.

[11] Corinne Saunders observes as much in the introduction to *Cultural Encounters*, p. 4.

[12] John Block Friedman, *Orpheus in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 39.

[13] David Lyle Jeffrey, 'The Exiled King: Sir Orfeo's Harp and the Second Death of Eurydice'. *Mosaic* 9 (1976): 45–60 (p. 50).

[14] Grimaldi, p. 156. While Grimaldi's point about Orfeo as a type of Christian pilgrim atoning in the wilderness certainly has its merits, I find some of the scriptural parallels she draws (such as the comparison of Orfeo with John Chrysostomus) forced.

[15] Corinne Saunders, *The Forest of Medieval Romance: Avernus, Broceliande, Arden* (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1993), pp. 137–138.

[16] Kenneth R. R. Gros Louis, 'The Significance of Sir Orfeo's Self-Exile'. *Review of English Studies* 18 (1967): 245–252 (p. 249).

[17] These parallels are noted by Felicity Riddy in 'The Uses of the Past in *Sir Orfeo*'. *The Yearbook of English Studies* 6 (1976): 5–15 (p. 7).

Unmarriageable Women: Renegotiating the Feminine in Michel Faber's *The Crimson Petal and the White* and Wilkie Collins' *The Woman in White*

Emmie Shand

In 1869, the English essayist William R. Greg shared his opinion on the so-called 'Woman Question' by writing his infamously titled article, 'Why Are Women Redundant?'. He explains:

> [...] there is an enormous and increasing number of single women [...] who, in place of completing, sweetening, and embellishing the existence of others, are compelled to lead an independent and incomplete existence of their own.[1]

According to Greg, the Victorian woman finds her purpose in marriage. To be a 'single woman' is to be an 'incomplete' woman. In other words, for a woman to be marriageable she must possess certain character traits before entering into married life: she must be unfulfilled, incomplete, and dependent on others. Wilkie Collins' *The Woman in White*, serialised between 1859 and 1860 but set a decade earlier, and Michel Faber's 2002 neo-Victorian novel *The Crimson Petal and the White*, set between 1874 and 1876, both consider this notion of Victorian women's

incompleteness[2]. Collins' Laura Fairlie fits Greg's requirements: she is entirely reliant upon her half-sister Marian Halcombe and later her husband Walter Hartright, both of whom shelter Laura from knowledge of sensitive material, which includes everything from her first husband Sir Percival Glyde's death to her uncanny resemblance to 'the woman in white' Anne Catherick. Furthermore, after marrying Walter, Laura finds purpose in 'sweetening' his existence, supporting him in bringing Percival and Count Fosco to justice, but never seeking justice for herself.

While Laura finds fulfilment in her second marriage to Walter, *The Woman in White* questions marriage's power imbalance as Laura is unfulfilled and unhappy in her first. Unable to divorce Percival, Laura is barred from finding happiness elsewhere until his (convenient) death. The novel therefore engages with the debates surrounding the legalisation of civil divorce in 1857, which highlighted the restrictiveness of an indissoluble marriage upon women in particular.[3] Margaret Oliphant, amongst others, voiced her concern for married women, writing in an unsigned 1856 article that '[m]arrying is like dying — as distinct, as irrevocable, as complete',[4] a point that Marian echoes in her diary, where she claims 'writing of [Laura's] marriage w[as] like writing of her death' (Collins 185). Similarly, in *The Crimson Petal and the White*, Agnes Rackham's marriage is 'as irrevocable' as death, and she is permanently unfulfilled.[5] Although her husband William Rackham cherishes Agnes as an angelic figure, she is effectively imprisoned in his house and in the company he chooses — partly as a married woman, and partly because of her "madness".

While both novels utilise married or *marriageable* women to question marital power relations, Collins and Faber interrogate women's position in Victorian marriages more successfully through an alternative figure — not the unmarried woman, a term suggestive of the negatively connoted "spinster", but from the perspective of the unmarriageable woman, embodied by Marian and Sugar. Although both attract men's interests — Collins' Marian becomes the unwitting centre of

Fosco's attention, and Faber's prostitute Sugar is praised by William as 'the most beautiful thing he has ever seen' (Faber 100) — neither character searches for a marriage that would delimit them as obedient and submissive subordinates. Furthermore, Marian and Sugar are given the novels' central voices and narrative agency. As Sharon Marcus argues in *Between Women*, Marian's position as 'female friend' in the marriage plot does not make her 'a static or dispensable secondary character', but gives her 'agency';[6] similarly, Sugar's rise through the social hierarchy guides the reader through the contemporary novel's five parts.

Having more power than their married female counterparts, it is Marian and Sugar's refusal to mould themselves into submissive, dependent wives that makes them unmarriageable. To enter into a marriage would be to strip them of the independence that defines their characters. Furthermore, by refusing to 'remain permanently childlike' and 'innocent' — terms which Deborah Gorman associates with the period's constructed 'concept of femininity' — they also refuse to internalise the gender-power relations that would enforce their subordination.[7] Faber's and, perhaps more surprisingly, Collins' works both show traits of the modern feminist novel. By giving voice to these category-resisting women, the writers endow Marian and Sugar with a creative power that is inaccessible to the novels' wifely women. Moreover, these novels reinterpret the neat "happy ending" of domestic bliss by placing Sugar and Marian within the family but outside the heterosexual marriage. While neither Marian nor Sugar themselves marry, both achieve fulfilment through friendships with and guardianships over traumatised women — Marian supports Laura, and Sugar helps William's wife Agnes and daughter Sophie, to escape their oppressive domestic situations and find fulfilment elsewhere. While reinforcing the suggestion that women achieve happiness by helping others, both texts free their female characters from abuse by men and, particularly in Faber's novel, from the

ideologies that cage women in the home, where they are unable to understand themselves or the outside world.

It is noteworthy, then, that Faber appropriates the Victorian novel to consider women's marital rights. As Cora Kaplan argues in *Victoriana*, the neo-Victorian 'ambition' is not only to reproduce a historical period, but to construct 'a virtual relationship between past and present', experimenting with the 'configurations of two key moments of modernity.'[8] Faber therefore uses an 1870s setting, a period of 'modernity' and rising capitalism, to reflect on twenty-first century concerns, including women's continued subordination in the workplace, changing laws and attitudes towards marriage, and the rise in single parenting.[9] Faber's neo-Victorianism re-engages with the marriage debates of Collins' time — debates that questioned the laws and traditions that supplied husbands with social power over wives. While Marian refuses to conform to societal norms by living with her sister instead of a husband and claiming that men are 'enemies' that 'drag us away from our parents' love and sister's friendship' (Collins 181), she nonetheless becomes integrated into Laura's marriage by the novel's end. Alternatively, Sugar — a twenty-first-century figure by nature of her intelligence, unorthodox beauty, and resistance to patriarchal oppression — cannot integrate into the Rackham family. Being a prostitute without a "real" name — unlike the respectable, middle-class Marian — Sugar reimagines the notion of family when she abducts/adopts Sophie Rackham. Sugar's capture of Sophie demonstrates her refusal to let Sophie be treated as Agnes and Sugar have been at the hands of William Rackham; she resists the ideological "family" that reinforces the oppressive Victorian gender ideology that endures in contemporary society. Faber's novel is thus to some extent a continuation of Collins' and other Victorians' feminist agenda. The unmarriageable woman found in Marian is re-appropriated in Sugar to resist the power relations still found in the institution of marriage, and to demonstrate the possibility of change.

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So as to understand the unmarriageable woman, we must first consider the marriageable woman — the 'childlike' and 'innocent' emblem of Victorian 'femininity' from which Marian and Sugar depart.[10] Laura and Agnes match Greg's criteria of marriageability: they are 'embellishing' or 'sweetening' domestic figures appreciated by men for their beauty and innocence, and they are 'incomplete' because they lack creative agency. Their inability to write or create art that has value outside the home is paralleled with a lack of understanding about their bodies. While Laura's creative attempts merely 'waste paint and spoil paper' (Collins 37), Walter and Marian repeatedly lie about her work's economic value, leaving her unaware of its worthlessness. Agnes, similarly, creates dresses to prove her sanity to the outside world — a feat that ultimately fails — and writes a spiritual book that remains unread by others in her lifetime. Both marked by "whiteness", Laura and Agnes always symbolise a lack: they are without autonomy, creativity, sexuality, power.

However, neither married woman gains, as Greg suggests they should, upon marriage. Aside from their ineffectiveness in the female roles of homemaking and parenting, neither bride discovers her sexuality with her husband; the psychological trauma caused by marriage instead drives both further from their bodies. Agnes has 'glanced' at her genitals 'perhaps twenty times in her whole life, each time with shame' (Faber 170), and it is implied that Laura's first marriage was unconsummated, as Percival tells Fosco that Laura 'is not in the least likely' to conceive (Collins 326). As Hélène Cixous writes in 'The Laugh of Medusa' — an essay that links female sexuality, creativity, and repression — these women are 'in the "dark"' about themselves, having been alienated from their bodies, which are 'turned into the uncanny stranger on display'.[11] Cixous argues that to 'return to the body which has been [...] confiscated from her', a woman must write, express, and create; thus, she argues that the process of writing is a pleasurable process of self-discovery that parallels the self-understanding gained through masturbation.[12] It is crucial that

Laura and Agnes — both, in Gorman's terms, 'asexual' wives — are unable to create anything valued by themselves or society.[13] While Christy Rieger argues that men 'preserve their power through control of the ill' in *The Crimson Petal and the White*, the male characters of Faber's and Collins' novels maintain power by keeping women's writing and artistic creations from being recognised.[14] Madness or illness in Agnes, Anne and Laura is therefore caused, in some measure, by their lack of self-awareness and their domestic enclosure.

According to Susan Gubar, women attempting to become writers or artists must also work against 'a long tradition [...] identifying the author as a male who is primary and the female as his passive creation', which 'excludes woman from the creation of culture, even as it reifies her as an artefact [sic] within' it.[15] This power relation of male-author-creator to female-object-creation can be seen when Walter turns to his watercolour portrait of Laura to express his love for her. Walter deliberates on her physical attributes, from praise of her 'light, youthful figure' and 'large and tender' eyes, to criticisms of her 'natural human blemishes' and slightly bent nose (Collins 51). Despite his lengthy discussion of Laura's physicality, Walter feels unsatisfied with his description. Shifting to the second person, Walter constructs Laura's image by addressing 'you' (an identity that seems to be both male and heterosexual): 'Think of her as you thought of the first woman who quickened the pulses within you [...] Let the kind, candid blue eyes meet yours' (52). Walter creates Laura as a physical form that produces sensations in men. As Laura is his narrative's subject but never writes her own account, Walter's and the reader's desire is valued over Laura's self-understanding. The fact that these opinions are drawn from a portrait, rather than her actual body, further reinforces Laura's objectification.

However, Laura continually acts the part of 'passive creation' that Walter constructs for her.[16] Overriding her dislike of her fiancé Percival in order to keep a promise made to her late father, Laura allows herself to be passed around and

controlled by men. Similarly, her marriages to Percival and Walter force her identity to be re-created as she adopts her husbands' names. It is hardly surprising, then, that Laura's artistic contributions at the end of the novel are deemed worthless. Her 'poor, faint, valueless sketches' (Collins 479) — drawings that reflect her lack of self-confidence as a creator — are a far cry from the overflowing and 'luminous torrents' that Cixous argues cause the sexual woman to 'burst with forms much more beautiful than those which are put up in frames and sold for a stinking fortune'; those 'in frames' are presumably created by men.[17] Laura, having no economic, artistic or sexual power, is only able to imitate men's drawings. But as Walter and Marian pretend her work is valuable, which they deem an 'innocent deception' (Collins 479), they continue the silencing process that inhibits the development of Laura's creative abilities, and alongside it her self-understanding. The 'only purchaser' of Laura's artwork is Walter, not because she is unable to create but because Walter keeps her artistic expressions 'hidden' within the house (479).

In this sense, women's domestication is central to their powerlessness. In a scene from Faber's novel that reinterprets Laura's stunted creativity, Agnes makes 'dozens of humming-birds' from her '"old" dresses' in an 'irresistible' creative mania (Faber 222). The violence with which she 'sliced', 'cannibalised', 'ruined', 'punctured' and 'disfigured' (222) material reveals a brutality lacking in Laura's 'wast[ing]' of paint and 'spoil[ing]' of paper (Collins 37). Agnes' impatient and manic creative urge parallels Cixous' description of the bursting desire to write and masturbate: 'Who, feeling a funny desire stirring inside her [...] hasn't thought she was sick?'[18] Agnes is "sick" with the desire to express herself. Her project fails because she lacks the right materials, and because her inspiration is a copy — it is from a magazine's 'novelty sewing pattern' (Faber 222). Being frequently related to sickness and birds, Agnes is mirrored in her creations: 'soft satin birds, drooping like sick things' (222). Furthermore, when Sugar first finds William's house she peers

through its metal fence, lettered with the Rackham "R", an image that confirms Agnes as a caged bird trapped in marriage to her husband and marked as his property (Faber 238). Agnes' destructive creation thus reflects her frustration that she is, as Rieger describes, 'trapped in a life of meaningless leisure' as an upper-class married woman.[19] Feeling the same shame that Cixous ascribes to writing and masturbating in secret, Agnes is 'chilled to recall' the incident (Faber 222), a reaction that creates and reinforces the madness that stops her creating freely or trying again. Although Faber resists concluding Agnes' story, her escape from the house under Sugar's guidance suggests the necessity of women's freedom of movement, specifically away from the home dominated by a husband or father, for the married woman's creative and personal liberation.

Although Oliphant argues that Victorian law was only against 'women *married*', as 'women unmarried are under no humiliations of legal bondage',[20] the unmarried Marian and Sugar are not free from Agnes and Laura's creative stiltedness. Sugar and Marian are writers — Sugar of '*The Fall and Rise of Sugar*' and Marian of her diary, both of which are used largely for private expressions (Faber 266). Sugar's novel, in which she envisions murdering male customers, is 'a tale of embraces charged with hatred and kisses laced with disgust, of practised submission' (Faber 228). Sugar's creative experience therefore derives from, in Gubar's terms, 'the terror of being entered, deflowered, possessed [...] all words which illustrate the pain of the passive self whose boundaries are being violated'.[21] While Sugar has greater agency than Laura or Agnes, she is still positioned as a passive and submissive woman and prostitute; her novel is the only space in which she can gain agency and authority by destroying (imaginary) men's bodies. Marian experiences a similar male intrusion when Fosco adds an entry to her diary. His praise of Marian as an 'Admirable woman!' and 'masterly' writer (Collins 336) is a bullying tactic which patronises her intelligence and makes her feel the 'terror of being entered' now that he knows her personal thoughts. For

both Sugar and Marian, their ability to resist objectification and oppression exists in their continued attempts to create and express themselves artistically. Eventually, both works are released from the domestic sphere — Marian's diary is published as evidence and Sugar's novel is accidentally released — allowing them to gain a limited power that is unattainable for the un-creating, feminine, marriageable woman.

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Unmarriageability, then, as portrayed in Collins' Marian and Faber's Sugar, is linked to a refusal to internalise — even as they perform — the psychological concept of femininity that keeps women dependent on, and incomplete without, men. Sugar's success, for example, depends on performing child-like femininity *and* sexual enjoyment: she will do 'anything the most desperate alley-slut will do', but as 'a virginal-looking girl' of 'child-like innocence' (Faber 35). It is worth noting that she is only child-*like* and virginal-*looking* — Faber here makes a distinction between the feminine appearance her customers desire, and the reality, exposed in Sugar's novel, that women performing this femininity feel, in Gubar's words, 'the pain of the passive self whose boundaries are being violated'. While Sugar privately performs for customers, she also gains power by performing a public identity. When Sugar is first introduced, she is mistaken as both 'a young man' and 'a lady', giving her greater social power and freedom of movement around the shops (Faber 26-27). Sugar thus destabilises the class and gender boundaries that should keep her, a lower-class female prostitute, powerless in society. Similarly, Sugar influences William, who raises her from prostitute to mistress and then governess, while continuing to appear submissive and obedient. However, when William discovers Sugar's pregnancy and subsequently dismisses her — demonstrating his unwillingness to marry her — Sugar refuses to continue performing feminine submission, instead choosing to uphold her limited agency and power by abducting his child.

Marian and Sugar, unmarriageable in their rejection of traditional femininity, are both ascribed masculine attributes to demonstrate their power. While Sugar is 'flat-chested' (Faber 26) and has a supposedly masculine mind — the narrator mocks, '[a] pity really, that Sugar's brain was not born into a man's head' (36) — she conceals her masculine power with 'expensive clothes' and 'feminine pride' to appear more like the character she performs (29). Marian, conversely, has 'an easy inborn confidence' in her androgyny (Collins 36). While Walter first thinks her beautiful, describing her body as 'perfection in the eyes of a man' which 'a sculptor would have longed to model', he is shocked at her 'ugly' masculine face: she is 'swarthy', has 'almost a moustache', and she is 'wanting in those feminine attractions of gentleness and pliability' (34-35). Walter uses the language of creation with which he described Laura: her bodily 'perfection' is only valuable in relation to the desire they produce 'in the eyes of a man', and he acts as male-artist-creator when he refers to 'a sculptor' longing 'to model' her body. Walter's frustration at Marian's appearance therefore stems from his inability to construct her as an object; she lacks the 'pliability' of femininity that would let him 'model' her into a figure for his pleasure. As Jenny Bourne Taylor argues in *In the Secret Theatre of Home*, Walter's portrayal of Marian 'is clearly a product of his own projection', but, she argues, this is at Walter's expense because it suggests that the 'natural beauty' found in Laura's femininity 'is a cultural construction'.[22] Despite insisting that as a woman she can do 'very little', Marian exudes social power by dominating the conversation and by anticipating Walter's criticisms of her as a woman: 'I can match you at chess, backgammon, écarté, and (with the inevitable female drawbacks) even at billiards as well'(36-38).

Despite a stronger emotional connection with Marian, Walter romantically invests in the more feminine Laura. In his sexual disinterestedness towards Marian, Walter agrees with Greg's judgements of society's 'natural anomalies', destined for celibacy and spinsterhood:

> There are women [...] who seem utterly devoid of the *fibre féminin*, [...] too passionately fond of a wild independence to be passionately fond of any mate [...] women who are really almost epicene; whose brains are so analogous to those of men, that they run nearly in the same channels, are capable of nearly the same toil, and reach nearly to the same heights; women [...] of hard, sustained, effective *power* [...] who are objects of admiration, but never of tenderness, to the other sex. Such are rightly and naturally single.[23]

As Marian has this 'wild independence' and intelligence — demonstrated most notably when she eavesdrops on Fosco and Percival from Blackwater Park's roof — Fosco's only move to block Marian's power is to patronise her. He, in 'large, bold, and firmly regular' handwriting, dominates the pages of Marian's diary feigning flattery: 'I feel how vivid an impression I must have produced to have been painted in such strong, such rich, such massive colours as these' (Collins 336-7). He even argues Marian could have been 'worthy [...] of ME' (336-37). Choosing a moment in which Marian's creative power has been diminished by illness — her writing in the passage above is fragmented and illegible — Fosco reasserts the 'tradition identifying the author as a male'.[24] In admiring the 'colours' she has 'painted' him in, he mocks Marian's attempts at authorship. Rather than being his creation, Fosco argues that *he* created impressions in *her* — belittling her authorial power. Fosco's ironic admiration of Marian parallels Greg's patronising view that unmarriageable women 'are objects of admiration, but never of tenderness', as Fosco's suggestion that Marian is worthy of him implies his desire to make her a form of wife to him, but without feeling 'tenderness' towards her. Fosco and Greg therefore mock and threaten women that refuse to comply with feminine passivity by marrying. However, that both men, one real and one fictional, feel the need to reassert their (male) power over these 'abnormal' women — Greg repeats that they

'nearly' have male power, but reduces them to '*celibates*',[25] while Fosco's threats are towards Marian even when she is immobilised by illness — suggests the unmarriageable woman's real threat to the patriarchal structures these men uphold.

Faber complicates the unmarriageable woman's portrayal as Sugar, although possessing 'wild independence', 'effective *power*' and 'brains' as a businesswoman (as she takes control of William's business affairs), is a prostitute rather than a celibate and her sexual encounters are displayed in explicit detail. Furthermore, William not only has 'admiration' for Sugar, but feels sexual 'tenderness' towards her. In William and Sugar's first sexual encounter after he purchases her from her mother and "owner" Mrs Castaway, he is 'delighted with every inch of her' and resolves to upgrade her to a house in Priory Close as his mistress (Faber 173). As Nadine Muller argues, William's purchase of Sugar is reminiscent of a marriage contract that appears to situate her 'economically in a more secure and independent situation than the wife' Agnes.[26] However, although Sugar is an object both of 'tenderness' and 'admiration', the arrangement's clandestine nature denies Sugar the social power of the wife — a position she is denied later in the novel in favour of the more "feminine", and more wealthy, Lady Bridgelow.

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Near the beginning of Faber's novel, Sugar's friend Caroline, another of Mrs Castaway's prostitutes, remembers her late family and considers how they shaped her life: 'It was them who used to make her life a *story*; they who seemed to be giving it a beginning, a middle and an end' (Faber 26). The traditional Victorian novelistic structure suggests that women's personal fulfilment is found in the family, and that this is linked somehow to written expression. Gubar uses similar imagery when she argues that 'no woman is a blank page' as the 'art' of producing children 'is woman's ultimate creativity'.[27] In both cases women's fulfilment is anchored in their reproductive function,

suggesting the environment for women's happiness is the heterosexual relationship or marriage. This seems the case in *The Woman in White*, which concludes with Laura's presumed happiness and security in her second marriage. As Laura bears '*the Heir of Limmeridge*' (Collins 627), her creation of children secures her family's home and income. Furthermore, Walter's narrative, which holds the potential to release the family from their repressed past, is created alongside the christening of 'little Walter' (625). Although Laura's creativity is suppressed by Walter and Marian's continued deception, as well as her non-contribution to Walter's narrative, the heterosexual marriage and family is the site that produces her 'ultimate creativity' and source of meaning — her son — and lends the conditions for her improved future happiness.

Laura and Walter's marriage is only successful, however, in that it includes Marian as a third partner. Marian tells Walter:

> After all we three have suffered together [...] there can be no parting between us, till the last parting of all. My heart and happiness, Walter, are with Laura and you. (621)

This speech echoes a marriage vow, with the alliterative phrase 'heart and happiness' indicating her love for the family, and the phrase 'till the last parting of all' suggesting the indissolubility of their bond — a feature that had defined all marriage until divorce was legalised in 1857.[28] Furthermore, the novel proclaims itself as a 'story' about 'a Woman's patience' and 'a Man's resolution' (9) — the capitalised words here resembling Man and Wife — while its conclusion praises Marian as 'the good angel of our lives' and the 'end' to 'our Story' (627). Although Marian opposes a legal marriage for herself, she still encourages Laura and Walter's marriage, and herself becomes integral to their family by educating their children: 'the first lesson they say to their father and mother shall be — We can't spare our aunt!' (621). As Marcus argues, Victorian 'kinship' was not 'exclusively heterosexual' with many accepted variants on

marriage; *The Woman in White* explores one possible form.[29] By allowing Marian social fulfilment as a maternal figure and marital partner in the Hartright family, Collins renegotiates Marian's position as unmarriageable by endowing her with a new kind of femininity that, rather than making her passive and weak, endows her with personal agency and social fulfilment.

Unlike Marian, Sugar only performs companionship with William; she cannot become part of his family because he does not offer her marriage. There is a brief possibility that Sugar will gain marital happiness and financial security when William takes Sugar, pregnant with his child, and his daughter Sophie to a photographer's studio. Like Caroline, Sugar uses novelistic language to demonstrate the possibility of fulfilment. Believing they are creating 'a family portrait installing her in the place of wife' (Faber 732), Sugar thinks '[t]he adventure is beginning; this is page one' (738). William is instead using her as a model on which to superimpose Agnes' face. Sugar realises her barring from the Rackham family when she imagines telling William, *'I'm carrying your child'*, a *'boy'* and *'heir'* to Rackham Perfumeries, describing this event as *'a gift from Fate'* (744). Her fantasy culminates in the idea that she and William *'could be married'* in the future (744). As Sugar's written fantasies normally use violent language, her appeal to fate reflects an outward performance of upper-class femininity rather than her own inner expression. That she remains silent, however, demonstrates Sugar's understanding that William is no longer interested in her performance, and that she cannot gain from him the marital happiness, security and family that she craves.

As Sugar does not become William's wife, Faber questions the possibility that marriage can offer a satisfactory novelistic conclusion. The longer Sugar stays confined in the house — a space which requires her continual performance — the more she re-enacts Agnes' femininity. Sugar's domestication and loss of power are linked when she falls down the stairs, 'spread[ing] her arms wide, like wings' and 'let[ting] herself fall'(748) — the bird and angel imagery both connecting her

with Agnes. When the 'body of Sugar' is found, she is 'motionless as a doll' (748) — an image associated with feminine passivity and pliability. While this passage challenges the idealisation of women as "Angel in the House" by suggesting women's inability to gain fulfilment when enclosed in the home, Sugar also parallels Agnes on the staircase earlier in the novel.[30] While Agnes' 'hazardous descent' downstairs is satirised — the possibility that 'her soft grey slippers' could get caught on a dress hem and 'send her tumbling' is fairly comical (130) — Sugar inherits Agnes' physical weakness from this scene. Furthermore, that 'the traces of Agnes' blood' were 'wholly visible' at Sugar's fall suggests the inescapable production of destructive femininity in this domestic space (748). It is crucial that Sugar has by this point abandoned novel-writing. Having no means of private expression, Sugar's performance of femininity becomes reality as she enacts the "wife." In this sense, marriage to William could not fulfil Sugar and, unlike Marian, she will not find an alternative, fulfilling adult relationship. Sugar finds purpose only as a single-mother figure to Sophie. In this sense, Kaplan's criticism of the novel's gender politics has validity — she argues that Faber's 'women are the only sympathetic gender' — as the distasteful portrayal of men goes beyond a distrust of marriage, suggesting the impossibility of equality in male–female relationships.[31]

Faber's novel, however, does not eliminate the possibility of change within the institution of marriage, or between men and women more generally, as Sugar's future is undetermined. When she accidentally releases her novel and Agnes' diaries in a 'fluttering mess' (Faber 810), Sugar becomes liberated from her past as a prostitute. This publication of her personal writings to liberate herself from traumatic experiences parallels the Hartright family's publication of their narrative, which vocalises their suffering even though the deceased Percival and Fosco cannot be punished because of it. In Faber's novel, however, the symbolic release of Agnes' diaries differs from Marian, Laura and Sugar's publications because Agnes is

absent from the novel. The releasing of her diary gains value instead in two ways: by publishing outside the domestic sphere the personal sufferings of a woman whose voice has been silenced, and by releasing Sugar from the "feminine" mentally-ill wife figure she temporarily becomes. Sugar's symbolic liberation from her past identity, leaving her open to the possibility of more fulfilling future relationships, also coincides with the appearance of a child in her life: Sugar turns her back on her escaped writings to run 'in pursuit of Sophie' (810). Sugar, like Marian, gains a new feminine power through her maternal authority; her (masculine) rejection of femininity is adapted to a "real" type of womanhood. As Georges Letissier argues, it is through her love for Sophie and not through the punishing of men that Sugar enacts her 'social revenge'.[32] Sugar, rather than writing her private novel, turns her creative attentions instead to producing educational verses to share with Sophie, her pupil and now daughter.

Just as the child is the symbol of a positively transformed future in *The Woman in White*, Sophie in Faber's novel is a specifically neo-Victorian site of twenty-first-century possibility. The neo-Victorian child is the 'virtual' link 'between past and present' that Kaplan describes, and in this way Faber creates Sugar as mother to the modern generation.[33] For example, Sophie's 'gorgeous French doll' (Faber 681), given to her as a present by William, is implicitly criticised for replicating the femininity that pacifies and subordinates women. The gifts Sugar prefers for Sophie—which she packs when they leave the Rackham household—are her educational books and 'spyglass', and the objects that allow Sophie to express her creativity, such as her 'pencils and crayons' and her 'own home-made Christmas cards' (813). While Collins challenges the institution of marriage and its formation of women as passive and non-creative objects through Marian, Faber continues his feminist agenda into the next generation. Little Walter, being wealthy and male, is unlikely to face the creative oppression that Laura and Marian have suffered, whereas Sophie is created in the image of a doll

like that of her mother. Faber's novel, destabilising the notion of a satisfactory ending with its abrupt anti-conclusion, continues the unmarriageable woman's rejection of subordination in Sophie and, implicitly, in the contemporary reader; Sugar and Sophie's escape from the text thus allows their project to enter into concerns of "today".

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Collins' *The Woman in White* and Faber's *The Crimson Petal and the White* both critique inequality between the sexes, and begin to renegotiate this imbalance through the hybrid masculine-feminine unmarriageable woman. As they are unwilling to submit to the passive, feminine "wife" stereotype, these women have greater power because they use their creative impulses to express themselves without feeling guilt or shame at their creations, allowing them to comprehend their situations and bodies in a manner that is unavailable to married women. Furthermore, the power that permits Marian to contribute to Walter's testament and allows Sugar to adopt Sophie is achieved through the publishing of writing by women — the release of these works from the home and their integration into the wider world. In this sense, Collins' and Faber's novels, although both written by men, similarly attempt to publish the debates concerning women's oppression in male-centred societies, found in the novels' mid- to late-Victorian settings and in the writers' contemporary periods.

The Woman in White, in centralising Marian's voice, reflects a changing attitude towards relationships between men and women. Marian's unmarriageability allows her to have equality with Walter and Laura, to become a detective by eavesdropping on the men at Blackwater Park, and to contribute her written account. In this way, Collins installs Marian's character with qualities usually repressed in (written) women: those which give her agency and creativity. That Faber chooses to re-engage with the Victorian novel and the figure of the (unusual) unmarriageable woman suggests the continuing

presence of gendered inequality. Sugar, as mistress, and Agne as wife, rely on William's finances to provide an income ar home, upon which their social status also rests. Sugar's taking Sophie suggests the (contemporary) possibility of wom breaking free from financial and social dependence on men; tl fact that the releasing of Sugar's novel and Agnes' diary occu simultaneously suggests a parallel creative and sexual liberation.

Moreover, in both novels the child is the figure th combines the unmarriageable woman's femininity ar masculinity in their parental power: that which, for Gubar, 'woman's ultimate creativity'. As the birth or adoption of a chil Walter and Sophie respectively, allows the female characters t put to rest their trauma at the hands of abusive men, the children are also the implied agents to enact future change. the novels' presentation of unmarriageable women is to advanc a feminist cause, however, it at first seems disheartening that *T Crimson Petal and the White*, unlike Collins' novel, excludes me from the feminist successes of its ending. On the other hand, Sophie is open to the oppression faced by Sugar and Agnes – while young Walter is protected by wealth as a male heir — th neo-Victorian novel, through Sugar's seizing of Sophie, seeks t break away from the cyclical nature of women's oppression th has ensured its continuation in the twenty-first century.

Notes

[1] William R. Greg, 'Why Are Women Redundant?' *Litera and Social Judgements* (E-book: Hathi Trust, 1876), pp. 27 308 (p.276). http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.3901506355221 (accessed 19 October 2016).

[2] Wilkie Collins, *The Woman in White*, ed. by Matthew Swe (London: Penguin, 2003) and Michel Faber, *The Crimson Petal an the White* (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2010).

[3] Sharon Marcus, *Between Women: Friendship, Desire, and Marriage in Victorian England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 3.

[4] 'The Laws Concerning Women'. *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* 79 (1856): 379-87 (p.380).

[5] Ibid., p. 380.

[6] Marcus, pp. 79, 12.

[7] Deborah Gorman, *The Victorian Girl and the Feminine Ideal* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 4-6.

[8] Cora Kaplan, *Victoriana: Histories, Fiction, Criticism* (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 9.

[9] Ibid., p. 9.

[10] Gorman, pp. 4-6.

[11] Hélène Cixous, 'The Laugh of Medusa', trans. by Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 1 (1976): 875-93 (pp. 876, 880).

[12] Ibid., p. 880.

[13] Gorman, p. 7.

[14] Christy Rieger, 'The Legacy of Medical Sensationalism in *The Crimson Petal and the White* and *The Dress Lodger*'. *Neo-Victorian Literature and Culture: Immersions and Revisitations*, ed. by Nadine Boehm-Schnitker and Susanne Gruss (New York, London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 153-64 (p. 155).

[15] Susan Gubar, '"The Blank Page and the Issues of Female Creativity'. *Critical Inquiry* 8 (1981): 243-63 (p. 247).

[16] Ibid., p. 247.

[17] Cixous, p. 876.

[18] Ibid., p. 876.

[19] Rieger, p. 161.

[20] 'The Laws Concerning Women', p. 380.

[21] Gubar, p. 256.

[22] Jenny Bourne Taylor, *In the Secret Theatre of Home: Wilkie Collins, Sensation Narrative, and Nineteenth-Century Psychology* (London, New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 115.

[23] Greg, p. 280.

[24] Gubar, p. 247.

[25] Greg, pp. 280-81.

[26] Nadine Muller, 'Selling Sugar: The (Feminist) Politics of Sex Work in Michel Faber's *The Crimson Petal and the White*'. *Sexuality and Contemporary Literature*, ed. by Joel Gwynne and Angelia Poon (Amherst, New York: Cambria Press, 2012), pp. 39-59 (p.49).

[27] Gubar, p. 260.

[28] Marcus, p. 204.

[29] Ibid., p. 12.

[30] Gorman, p. 5.

[31] Kaplan, pp. 99-100.

[32] Georges Letissier, '*The Crimson Petal and the White*: A Neo-Victorian Classic'. *Rewriting/Reprising: Plural Intertextualities*, ed. by Georges Letissier (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2009), pp. 113-25 (p. 117).

[33] Kaplan, p. 9.

Sentience and Sentimentality: The Problem of Being Without Body in Late Twentieth-Century Science Fiction

Claire Margerison

Science fiction interrogates matters of the human condition, dissecting and representing them to their readership in new ways, allowing audiences to gain alternative perspectives and to view mundane aspects of humanity differently. One of the main concerns of science fiction of the late twentieth century is the interaction and relationship between the mind and the body. This is largely due to a rapid development of technology, and a growing scientific and social interest in the nature of what it means to be human. There was a desire to believe 'in the coherence and rationality of the individual, the integrity of personal relationships, and the dignity of human accomplishments' at this time.[1] Science fiction was and remains a medium for writers to explore and question this notion of humanity. This article will look at the ways in which Arthur C. Clarke's 1968 novel *2001: A Space Odyssey*, Christopher Columbus' 1999 film *Bicentennial Man*, and William Gibson's 1984 novel *Neuromancer* accept, contest or reject whether a mind can exist absent from a body.[2] There is a fundamental sense in science fiction that, as Nicholas O. Pagan observes, we come to understand our own minds through writing about the encounters with constructions of other minds; such as the

examples of artificial intelligence, androids, and virtual realities explored in this article.[3]

First, I will look at the ways in which Clarke uses the character of HAL 9000 in *2001: A Space Odyssey* as a means of rejecting a Cartesian notion of dualism. In simple terms, Cartesian dualism frames the mind and body as entirely separate entities, and not only this but as separate substances. The premise of René Descartes' argument is that the only thing he cannot doubt is that he is thinking; leading him to the now famous phrase '*cogito ergo sum*': 'I think, therefore I am'.[4] In opposition to notions of dualism, Clarke's Hal goes some way to frame a sentient, sentimental, non-human mind; reflecting Donna Haraway's notion of the cyborg by confusing the binary between sentimental human and unemotional machine. In her work 'A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century', Haraway argues that cyborg imagery can suggest 'a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves'.[5] Christopher Columbus' *Bicentennial Man*, on the other hand, represents the mind and body as separate, physical entities. By exploring how Andrew Martin is able to behave and appear more human than robotic, the film depicts the mind as a physical, but separate, entity to the physical body, which the protagonist eventually acquires through *seeming* human. I will look at the ways in which the character of Andrew reflects the ideas explored by Silvan Tomkins in his writing on affect theory. Finally, unlike Clarke and Columbus, Gibson writes using a purposefully binary framework in order to expose how limiting this can be. Although Gibson writes through a set of binaries — the physical body and non-physical mind — he does so in order to frame virtual reality as a liberating space free from physical constraints and societal binaries. My reading of this text considers the extent to which Gibson would agree with Haraway's notion of the cyborg and whether it is a productive way to consider human and non-human minds. Ultimately, I suggest that there is a questioning of the extent to which

machines can be considered sentient. (Here, I understand sentient to mean 'able to perceive or feel things'.)[6] Exploring the various non-human representations in these texts, I argue that such figures allow the writers to problematise the notion of the human mind as a separate, non-physical substance, and how this reveals their understanding of and anxiety around machines.

Only a mind

In Arthur C. Clarke's novel *2001: A Space Odyssey* the character of HAL 9000 is framed in a way that rejects Cartesian dualism, due to his physical, programmed mind and sentimental nature. The novel begins when a group of man-apes find a black monolith, and this moment births their ability to murder and to control their environment — ultimately leading to the ascent of man. Then, the novel moves to the year 1999, to a base on the Moon. Here they too find a monolith. This leads to the main focus of the story: Clarke's narrative follows Dr. David Bowman and Dr. Francis Poole on the *Discovery One* on a mission to Saturn. It is on this ship that Hal features as the ship's computation crew member. I will focus on two key moments in the novel — Hal's decision to kill the human crew members, and the moment at which Hal's cognitive function is removed — in order to establish how Clarke represents Hal as having humanity without the need of a human body. It is worth noting that Clarke was by no means the first to consider the nature of the relationship between humans and machines. As early as Samuel Butler's *Erewhon*, published in 1872, writers were considering the implications of this relationship.[7]

It is important to consider that the context of this novel, written during the Cold War, could have a bearing on how Clarke breaks down the binary between machine and human. When the book was published in 1968, the Space Race was drawing to a close.[8] The politics surrounding the desire to reach the Moon and explore space were contentious issues when

Clarke was writing, since space became another area in which to gain control and prove a country's power and technological abilities. Science fiction narratives became a way for writers to explore these desires and concerns. One such concern is whether the authority figure of the scientist is in fact needed when you introduce a technology like Hal. In his text, for example, Clarke places the scientists in a deep sleep as they will not be needed until much later in the mission. Matthew Hersch comments that '[i]n science fiction of the late-1960s, the scientist aboard a space vehicle was invariably a helpless and untrustworthy figure'.[9] He goes on to say that, in *2001: A Space Odyssey*, 'the ship's computer decides the mission would be better accomplished without interference from these eggheads and murders them'.[10] Hersch's exploration of the film foregrounds the scientists as "dead weight" and places emphasis on Hal's actions on the ship. It is interesting to note that Hersch understands Hal as making conscious decisions, and states that he "murders" the scientists on board, framing him as sentient. Hal, which stands for '*H*euristically programmed *AL*gorithmic computer' (Clarke 97), is presented as the sixth member of the crew on board the *Discovery*. This includes Hal as a member of the human crew, despite his not being human. That Hal is not given a human-like body limits the extent to which he can be aligned with the crew. Yet by including Hal as a crew member, Clarke is arguably suggesting a conflation of human and machine identities.

The primary human-like aspect of Hal's identity is his programmed speech. His conversational programming, such as, 'Sorry to interrupt the festivities' (Clarke 128), gives the impression of human conversation and sentimentality — Hal is programmed to sound apologetic to give the illusion of humanity. There is a sense that his conversational programming makes Hal appear more human and this ultimately does lead the crew to treat him as sentient: when discussing the possibility that Hal has made an error Poole phrases Hal's potential mistake as being 'a slight case of hypochondria'. There is a sense that Poole

and Bowman are treating the issue with sensitivity so as not to offend Hal: 'They both knew, of course, that Hal was hearing every word, but they could not help these polite circumlocutions. Hal was their colleague, and they did not wish to embarrass him' (Clarke 146). Their response to his language and attitudes towards the crew shows the strong influence his conversational character has on them. Furthermore, Clarke explicitly states that 'Hal could pass the Turing test with ease' (Clarke 99). The test, developed by Alan Turing in the 1940s, proposes that machines could be classified as intelligent if they could communicate with the illusion of human speech; the moment you cannot differentiate between the human and the computer, the machine passes the Turing test.[11] By alluding to this well-known test, Clarke is emphasising the physicality of the human mind: if a programmed, physical machine can replicate a human mind, then the human mind must also be physical. The sentience of Hal and his human-like speech confuses the binaries between human and machine, and thus breaks down the differentiation between the physical body and non-physical mind.

Clarke frames Hal as sentient while simultaneously eliminating the need for a physical body; his sentient identity, whether human-like or otherwise, is not contingent upon having a form that appears human. However, it is important to note that Hal must have a physical space in which to exist, since he ceases to exist when Dave Bowman removes his physical memory units. As Bowman removes the units, he considers, 'I wonder if he can feel pain?', and considers himself to be 'an amateur brain surgeon [...] carrying out a lobotomy' (Clarke 170), revealing that Bowman is indeed considering the humanity of Hal and the ethical implications of what he is doing. The process of a lobotomy was meant to intervene 'with the body, which was supposed to cause a positive change in the patient' and altered their patterns of behaviour.[12] The reference to lobotomy could also point to the physicality of the brain, as well as to the deeply controversial nature of altering a person's brain

in that way. However, Hal is defined by his programming: as a material, sentient machine Hal is 'guided by a sentient survival principal' which ultimately causes his demise, since he feels Bowman and the crew are hindering the mission.[13] His decision to maintain the progress of the mission means he must end the lives of the crew; despite the ethical complications of this, it does illustrate Hal's sentience and supports the view that he can make conscious decisions. Clarke depicts Bowman as, 'destroying [Hal's] mind', rendering him into 'nothing' by removing his cognitive function (Clarke 170). There is a sense that Clarke is also referencing the debilitating effect of lobotomy on psychiatric patients, and arguably equating humanity to cognitive function.

The interactions between, and behaviours of, the human crew of the *Discovery* further break down conventional oppositions between inhuman machine and sentimental human. Clarke explores what ultimately differentiates Bowman, a human, and Hal, a machine. If both are believed to be sentient, then what differentiates them? Clarke uses the act of killing to confuse the differences between them, since it is in fact Hal's death that is treated with more sentimentality. When Hal kills other members of the crew, the narrative frames Bowman as acting selfishly — choosing to save himself rather than grieve the loss of his crewmates:

> He could not be sure if a flicker of consciousness had passed across the waxen features; perhaps one eye had twitched slightly. But there was nothing that he could do now for Whitehead or any of the others; he had to save himself. (Clarke 165)

Although the Bowman's selfishness is simply his will to survive, this is complicated by the somewhat uncanny interaction between the crew members when Bowman sees a 'flicker of consciousness' on Whitehead's 'waxen features'; Whitehead's body is no longer spoken of in human terms and it is unclear whether he is alive or not. This blurring of alive versus not alive

is equally relevant in our consideration of Hal. Haraway argues that,

> Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines. *Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves are frighteningly inert.*[14]

Haraway's observation encapsulates how Clarke confuses the binary between inhuman machine and sentimental human through his use of sympathy. As previously discussed, Bowman's actions towards Hal portray Bowman as ruthless and Hal as the victim of murder. There is a larger degree of pathos given to Hal, especially since the narrative invests more emotional energy in the removal of Hal's sentience. If, as Geoff King and Tanya Krzywinska argue, '[h]umans are supposed to embody particular qualities — especially feelings, intuition, and emotions — that often clash with the demands of "scientific" objectivity or rationality', there should be some definitive moment of difference in Hal and Bowman's acts of killing.[15] However, this is not the case: Bowman and Hal both act ruthlessly. These aspects render Hal more human-like and Bowman more robotic, blurring the lines between the two. Clarke ultimately breaks down the dichotomies of human and machine, rendering the physical mind the focus of his text.

A malfunctioned machine turned human

The 1999 film *Bicentennial Man*, directed by Chris Columbus, uses the idea of artificial intelligence in order to endorse the notion of mind and body as separate entities. Though entirely mechanical, Andrew Martin gradually becomes more human-like in appearance and behaviour, largely due to the way he acts and

the way his body is physically altered. However, the representation of a machine-figure "becoming" human is problematised by the simple fact that Andrew is presented as a malfunction. For example, Sir tells Andrew that he is 'a unique robot' (Columbus) and therefore makes the decision to educate and "humanise" him. It is some unique aspect of Andrew's mind, or essentially programming, that renders him able to become more human-like. There is a sense that Andrew's humanity is contingent upon the contents of his computational mind: he is ultimately rendered human-like because he is able to learn to engage in human behaviour due to his programming. Using Silvan Tomkins' affect theory, 'a simplified and powerful summary of a larger set of affect experiences' that fundamentally give humans their humanity,[16] I argue that Andrew's increasing desire for a human body (as he learns to act and feel more human) suggests that a human body is an essential part of being human. Affect theory is a useful way to understand Andrew's movement towards humanity, since Tomkins' theory provides a way of understanding human behaviour in terms of an action and response model.

Throughout the film, Andrew is presented as a child-like character who learns about social discourses. Commenting on how technology interacts with social ideology, Michael Ryan and Douglas Keller affirm that 'technology represents everything that threatens the grounding of conservative social authority and everything that ideology is designed to neutralise'.[17] Andrew's initially child-like character minimises this threat: there is no immediate sense that he could be more powerful than the human family of which he is a part. However, as he becomes more human-like, it is exactly this threat that leads Andrew to be feared by his peers. His ignorance prompts him to challenge social norms and the film uses humour as a way to explore this. For instance, in order to comprehend the notion of a joke, Andrew must first understand figurative speech and the sign system in which society invests. Tomkins argues that,

> human beings [are] governed by a feedback system in which a predetermined state is achieved by utilising information about the difference between the achieved state at the moment and the predetermined state to reduce this difference to zero.[18]

Using this model, Andrew learns to be human by acting and responding in the appropriate way. There is an occasion where Andrew tells his family all of the jokes he has learnt in succession and very quickly, gaining the response from Sir, 'It was fine, but we might want to talk about appropriateness and, um, timing' (Columbus). The film uses the trivial nature of jokes in order to expose the intricacies in the ways we use our language and, significantly, the fact that it is learned.

In the film, Andrew gaining a body is the pinnacle of his being considered human: if he gains a human body, and thus mortality, he will be accepted in society as human. This is interesting to consider in contrast to Hal, whose lack of body is never an issue, and to Gibson's *Neuromancer*, in which the characters reject the bodily world in order to be more free (as I discuss in the following section). Andrew's journey to humanity is epitomised by his desire for a body, ultimately making his humanity equivalent to his bodily nature. Silvan Tomkins argues that in order for a machine to 'become' human, it

> would in all probability require a relatively helpless infancy followed by a growing competence through its childhood and adolescence. In short, it would require time in which to learn how to learn through making errors and correcting them.[19]

Andrew parallels this notion of growth, as previously mentioned through his learning of jokes. The film plays with the genre of comedy, presenting Andrew as a loveable, innocent character, contrasting tropes of machine as undesirable and undesiring. Robin Williams' portrayal of Andrew depicts his development

from inhuman machine to robotic human, as he learns how to respond and act like a human. There is a sense that Andrew's development into a human-like robot parallels an idea of a child learning the appropriate responses to certain feelings and actions; he is only permitted to have a body and be regarded as human once he behaves and can be recognised as one.

The idea of machines performing humanity is one that is explored by John Searle in his thought experiment, 'The Chinese Room'. The idea behind this experiment is that if a man were in a room with a list of appropriate Chinese responses to questions in Chinese given to him, he would be able to maintain a coherent conversation. However, what is fundamentally important to Searle is that although the man appears to maintain a coherent conversation, he cannot understand what he is saying. Searle's response to this is 'though the man in the room does not understand Chinese, the man is only part of a larger system'.[20] In the same way, robots can mimic human behaviour without understanding it. Andrew arguably learns to *perform* humanity by reprogramming his responses, but does not necessarily *understand* the behaviours in which he engages, calling into question whether he can really become human.

Columbus places emphasis on Andrew's physicality, with a particular focus on his anthropomorphism as the film progresses. There is a sense that by reducing Andrew to a physical body and a physical mind, Columbus is registering the ways in which science fiction, '[indexes] human consciousness, human being, human will, and, at the most fundamental level, self-conscious animation or human life' and consequently exposing the materiality of the human condition.[21] The fact that Andrew is intentionally made to look and behave more human throughout the film highlights the importance of his physical being and the way he identifies. In order to *feel* human, he must *appear* human. The equating of the physical body, or the actions of the body, to humanity is thus a large focus of this film. Unlike Clarke and Gibson, Columbus' robot desires to both act human and look human. To do this, Tomkins argues, the machine,

Andrew in this case, 'must be equipped to function with less certainty' and also 'must be motivated'.[22] As well as this, it must have 'a lively concern for its own integrity and reproduction' in order to partake in an affect system, in which it would experience 'particular qualities of excitement, joy, fear, sadness, shame, and anger'.[23] Ultimately, it is my contention that Andrew reflects these qualities; Columbus' film shows Andrew change from sure, cold robot to uncertain, awkward human with what Mike Higgins describes as 'an uncannily human personality'.[24] For instance, by having Andrew fall in love, Columbus introduces the ethical dilemma of whether human feelings constitute humanity and merit a human body. However, Higgins critiques the representation of an android in the film, claiming the anthropomorphism of Andrew boils down to 'the star's trademark wisecracking'.[25] It is difficult to see Andrew as a representative android since his character is so unique to Williams' portrayal.

However, one could criticise the limited representation of human identity in this film since it largely reflects a white, patriarchal depiction of society. Andrew's characterisation reflects a particular type of anthropomorphism and can be criticised for its lack of diversity; in *Bicentennial Man*, being human is represented as being white and male. Eleanor Sandry asks, 'If one builds a white Caucasian male robot will this limit the range of situations within such a robot can communicate successfully, or is any form of humanness sufficient?'[26] If we are presented with the ideal as a white male human, does it not simply re-affirm hegemonic ideologies? His essential identity ultimately relies on what he looks like, illustrated by his desire for money in order to buy, then wear clothes (*Bicentennial Man*, 1999). Susan Leigh Anderson comments, '[Andrew] started wearing clothes, so that he would not be so different from human beings and later he had his body replaced with an android one for the same reason'.[27] This notion of Andrew transforming from "robot" to "android", or 'a robot resembling a human being', informs the idea that Andrew's materiality,

though changing, essentially forms his identity.[28] Unlike in a dualist perspective, it matters to Andrew what his physical body looks like, and that it reflects his physical mind. His body at first resembles a metallic, traditional robot, and this physically reflects his early stages of life and his inability to act or appear human. The change in Andrew's appearance is drastic; however, it is still clear that his body remains fundamentally mechanical. This connection is vital to understanding Columbus's endorsement of a materialist perspective since, although mind and body are separate, they are both material in this case.

Unlike *2001: A Space Odyssey*'s Hal, *Bicentennial Man*'s Andrew focuses on the materiality of his body and this highlights the importance of his body to his ability to identify as human. Tomkins' affect theory has helped illustrate how Andrew's physicality and his way of acting and responding to other humans registers his desire to be identified as human. This suggests that human-like could become synonymous with human. Andrew's desire for mortality, and to be recognised as a human throughout the film endorses the idea of a *posthuman* body which still identifies as human, epitomised by the example of Andrew or Hal, or even of a being without body such as *Neuromancer*'s Case (discussed in the following section). Mervyn Bendle defines 'posthumanism' as, '[embracing] all scientific and technological means available [...] to move beyond the present stage of human development'.[29] He goes on to argue that *Bicentennial Man* 'explored the meaning, *for cyborgs themselves*, of their situation as creatives living on the boundary between human and machine'.[30] This encapsulates Andrew's characterisation; his body and human-like mind are eventually represented as one when his humanity is acknowledged by President Marjorie Bota. *Bicentennial Man* raises questions regarding the concept of the human brain as a material object, and emphasises the importance of a human body in identifying as human.

language when discussing an absence of body, as Case's understanding of the world may simply rely on metaphors of the human body. Ralph Pordzik suggests that in *Neuromancer* we find a 'new step in the evolution of humanity has been made; a new era of bio-technology is beginning to silhouette against the old and dying matrix of [Cartesian dualism]'.[34] In the novel, Gibson begins to develop a sense of a self outside of the traditional dualisms, and he does this by using existing language to suggest a self outside of it.

Gibson also engages with the idea of how an artificial, mechanical mind differs from a human mind. This further complicates Gibson's endorsements of a binary framework, because it is not complicit with Haraway's idea of a cyborg as a 'hybrid of machine and organism',[35] and thus complicates the amount of agency a human mind like Case's has within the virtual reality. The characters of Wintermute and Neuromancer are framed as entirely virtual. However, like Hal, they are programmed to act a certain way and to function as means of representing the human minds as more free. Wintermute claims it has a 'compulsion' to act the way it does and it does not 'know why' (Gibson 246). This lack of agency separates Wintermute from a character like Case and thus reinstates binaries in the virtual world, where Case's mind exists as a symbol for freedom compared not only to his physical body but also to the artificial minds of Neuromancer and Wintermute. These elements of human control over the environment are problematic when reading a space as free from hierarchy and dichotomies, such as Haraway desires in her manifesto. Worthington argues that 'cyberpunk literature attempts to retain for the postmodern, fragmented, constructed subject an element of control over its environment', and despite this being 'an important tool for the empowerment of the individual', there is a sense that Gibson is only able to envisage this within the traditional binary framework.[36]

The character of Neuromancer, a play on the word 'necromancer' pertaining to ideas of magic and communication

beyond the living world, experiences more development than Wintermute. However, this is arguably because it has been programmed this way: the name Wintermute itself alluding to the character's lack of voice. While Wintermute is "hive mind", Neuromancer is "personality"; Neuromancer is represented as a little boy, who Case does not know, it speaks in riddles, and its narrative voice is purposefully tangential and fragmented. This breakdown of rational versus irrational mind through narrative technique rejects any sense of physical body, focusing only on a sentimental versus inhuman binary. Neuromancer's convoluted narrative establishes a virtual mind just as complex as the human mind; for example, 'I call up the dead. But no, my friend [...] I *am* the dead, and their land' (Gibson 289). Both Wintermute and Neuromancer represent the broken-down entities of mind; one representing calculation and rationality, and the other the more erratic and fragmented aspects of the unknown subconscious. Gibson gives his readers these fictional and extreme representations of the reduced mind in order for them to gain a better sense of their own minds — highlighting the self-reflective quality of science fiction.[37]

Conclusion

These examples from the late twentieth century show how creators of science fiction were actively looking at the relationship between humans and machines and questioning the extent to which the human mind and body were separate entities. The impact of advances in technology resulted in a concern over the ways in which humans could identify themselves to others, and to what degree machinery could be considered a threat to that. Clarke and Columbus' representations of robotic machines reflect a rejection of Cartesian dualism due to their ability to be accepted as humans, as seen in *Bicentennial Man*, or given more sympathy, as seen in *2001: A Space Odyssey*. I have argued that these representations show a genuine concern over the distinction between humanity

and machinery. Gibson, conversely, embraces a notion of Cartesian dualism in order to explore the idea of being outside of binaries through his representation of a virtual world. His focus on the mind and rejection of the body allows him to create an alternative space in which people and machines are not limited by bodies. These fictions ultimately show how writers were questioning whether machines could be considered sentient and how, as evidenced in Clarke's novel, that might change perceptions of humanity — what it means to be human. Further research might address whether this has changed in twenty-first century science fiction, as not only has technology increasingly become an increasingly significant part of our daily lives, but also is progressively being made to replicate human behaviour.

Notes

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[2] Arthur C. Clarke, *2001: A Space Odyssey* (London: Orbit, 2000); *Bicentennial Man*, dir. Chris Columbus (Columbia TriStar Film Distributors International, 1999); and William Gibson, *Neuromancer* (London: Voyager, 1995).

[3] Nicholas O. Pagan, *Theories of Mind* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 21.

[4] René Descartes, *Meditations on the First Philosophy*, ed. and trans. by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 17.

[5] Donna Haraway, 'A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century'. *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (London: Free Association Books Ltd, 1991), pp. 149-182 (p. 181).

[6] *Oxford English Dictionary Online*. http://www.oed.com (accessed 4 March 2017).

[7] Mark Bould and Sherryl Vint, *The Routledge Concise History of Science Fiction* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 32.

[8] A. van Riper, 'From Gagarin to "Armageddon": Soviet-American Relations in the Cold War Space Epic'. *Film & History* 31.2 (2001): 45-51 (p. 46).

[9] Matthew H. Hersch, 'Return of the Lost Spaceman: America's Astronauts in Popular Culture, 1959-2006'. *Journal of Popular Culture* 44.1 (2011): 73-92 (pp. 81).

[10] Ibid., p. 82.

[11] Andy Clarke, 'A Brain Speaks'. *Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence*, ed. by Susan Schneider (Chichester: Blackwell, 2009), pp. 122-125 (p. 127).

[12] Marietta Meier, '"Adjusting" People: Conceptions of the Self in Psychosurgery After World War II'. *Medicine Studies* 1.4 (2009): 353-366 (p. 357).

[13] William Anselmi and Lise Hocan, 'The Gaze that Blinds Us: Myth, Technology and Power in Ophree, 2001: A Space Odyssey and Hugo'. *Journal of Critical Studies in Business & Society* 4.1 (2013): 67-87 (p. 83).

[14] Haraway, p. 152 (my emphasis).

[15] Geoff King and Tanya Krzywinska, *Science Fiction Cinema: From Outerspace to Cyberspace* (London: Wallflower, 2000), p. 12.

[16] Silvan Tomkins, 'Shame-Humiliation and Contempt-Disgust'. *Shame and its Sisters: a Silvan Tomkins Reader,* ed. by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 133-178 (p. 165).

[17] Michael Ryan and Douglas Keller, 'Technophobia/Dystopia'. *Liquid Metal: The Science Fiction Film Reader*, ed. by Sean Redmond (London: Wallflower Press, 2004), pp. 48-56 (p. 49).

[18] Silvan Tomkins, 'What Are Affects?'. *Shame and its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader,* ed. by Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick and Adam Frank (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 22-74 (p. 44).

[19] Ibid., p. 40.

[20] John R. Searle, *Mind: A Brief Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 70.

[21] Gretchen Blake, 'Continuum of the Human'. *Camera Obscura* 22.66 (2007): 60-91 (p. 62).

[22] Tomkins, 'What Are Affects?', p. 41.

[23] Ibid., p. 41.

[24] Michael Higgins, 'Bicentennial Man'. *Sight and Sound* 10.3 (2000): 41-42, (p. 41).

[25] Ibid., p. 42.

[26] Eleanor Sandry, 'Re-evaluating the Form and Communication of Social Robots: The Benefits of Collaborating with Machine-like Robots'. *International Journal of Social Robots* 7.3 (2015): 335-346 (p. 338).

[27] Susan Leigh Anderson, 'Asimov's "The Three Laws of Robotics" and the Machine Metaethics'. *AI & Society* 22.4 (2003): 477-493 (p. 479).

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[29] Mervyn F. Bendle, 'Teleportation, Cyborgs, and The Posthuman Ideology'. *Social Semiotics* 12.1 (2002): 45-62 (p. 48).

[30] Ibid., p. 57

[31] Claire Sponsler, 'Cyberpunk and the Dilemmas of Postmodern Narrative: The Example of William Gibson'. *Contemporary Literature* 33.4 (1992): 625-644 (p. 629).

[32] Marjorie Worthington, 'Bodies that Natter: Virtual Translations and Transmissions of the Physical'. *Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction* 43.2 (2002): 192-208 (p. 192).

[33] Haraway, p. 149.

[34] Ralph Pordzik, 'The Posthuman Future of Man: Anthropocentricism and the Other of Technology in Anglo-American Science Fiction'. *Utopian Studies* 23.1 (2012): 142-161, (p. 149).

[35] Haraway, p. 149.

[36] Worthington, p. 195.

[37] Steve Neal, '"You've got to be fucking kidding!": Knowledge, Belief, and Judgment in Science Fiction'. *Liquid Metal: The Science Fiction Film Reader*, ed. by Sean Redmond (London: Wallflower Press, 2004), pp. 11-16 (p. 12).

It is a Sin to Start a Family: Motherhood and Radicalism in Revolutionary Russia

Angelina Lesniewski

Revolutionary women, often neglected by history, are stereotyped as divorced from personal concerns. This view is both limited and inaccurate. The mainstream narrative of the Russian Revolution, the centenary of which passed this March, suffers from this misconception. When the personal lives of female participants are remembered, it is usually for their sexual relationships with men, while the deep tenderness of motherhood is ignored despite its reciprocal influence on revolutionary activity.

While the women of the revolution are gaining increasing scholarly attention, they are not being treated in their entirety. When their roles as mothers are noted, the interrelated nature of motherhood and political activity is rarely brought to light; furthermore, it is rarely treated as a standard issue among revolutionary women. Most scholars focus on a particular party (such as Evans Clements' *Bolshevik Women* or Hillyar and McDermid's *Midwives of Revolution*) or a specific block of time (Porter's *Fathers and Daughters* or Broido's *Apostles Into Terrorists*). Even in the case of Hillyar and McDermid's *Revolutionary Women in Russia*, which cites itself as collective biography spanning multiple classes and parties throughout the revolutionary period (1880-1917), the reciprocal relationship

between childrearing and politics, especially in children's influence on their mothers' work, is neglected; the presence of children instead forms a statistical backbone rather than informing the content of their subjects' revolutionary work.[1] This article seeks, in some small part, to rectify this oversight as well as to provide a clearer, more rounded picture of these women — not just as mothers, but as political figures.

This study is inherently limited. Using the women's own words to describe their relationships with and feelings toward their children and their work necessarily confines my sample pool to women educated enough to read and write, primarily those of the intelligentsia, and, within that subset, only those who had the opportunity or desire to leave a written record. Thus, only a small percentage of women who participated in revolutionary activities in the decades covered can be represented here, or indeed at all. Interestingly, it is the written words themselves which may have served to downplay the role and importance of children on women's political decisions.

Russian women, as with so many of their Western counterparts at the turn of the twentieth century, were recognised mainly as satellites of men: as mothers, wives, and daughters. Education was limited, unobtainable for the majority of women, and geared specifically toward making one an agreeable wife. Employment was unorthodox to the point of scandal; excluding typically nurturing roles like teacher, nurse, or domestic, 'women's lives were confined to home and family because of the tradition of marriage and motherhood'.[2] Despite the occasional liberty, such as the right to own property after marriage, women of the intelligentsia were disenfranchised politically and socially. In patriarchal Russia, a woman's merit stemmed solely from maternity.[3]

Motherhood as a condition was simultaneously idolized and undervalued; the raising of healthy children was the highest accomplishment for a woman in the private

sphere, but hardly treated with the same esteem as the nation-building done by men in public. Yet despite its venerated status, motherhood among the intelligentsia was relatively laisse-faire. According to Engel, 'The more conscientious mother might assume a supervisory role, but most seemed satisfied to inspect their children in the morning and evening and receive reports from nurse, governess, or tutor.'[4]

The revolutionary movement embodied a similar bias. Although they received greater freedom and respect in radical circles than in society, it nevertheless took decades of involvement in positions of high risk and low respect (as secretaries, distributors of leaflets, and organisers of safe-houses) before women were truly recognised as political agents and capable of leadership. Little room was made for parenthood, which distracted from revolutionary work and, along with marriage and homemaking, was perceived as making women less reliable. Few parties, the Bolsheviks excepted, incorporated specific feminist issues such as childcare and maternity issues into their party platforms.

It comes as little surprise, then, that motherhood is largely missing from revolutionary women's memoirs. These texts were spaces for women to highlight their social and political contributions; lovers, husbands, and children have been largely edited out since personal interactions were regarded as inferior to public achievement. Discussion of children was also avoided given the unorthodox nature of revolutionary upbringing. These women had to decide how best to balance their roles as revolutionaries and mothers, or if such a balance were possible. Unlike traditional bourgeois mothers, these women brought their children across great distances — to Siberia, Germany, or England — even to prison. When they could not be both mother and radical, they gave their children to family or strangers to raise in their stead, seeing them infrequently or never again. Letters were often a substitute for daily interaction.

Perhaps more important than this downplay of biology is the downplay of emotion. The decisions revolutionary women had to make often resulted in painful separation from their children which they could not bring themselves to recollect or record, out of sorrow, guilt, or both. Their love for their children was compounded by loss, and made them unwilling to dwell on their motherhood in their memoirs. Furthermore, their determination to be seen as worthwhile revolutionaries led them to avoid the less respected subject of parenthood.

Inevitably, absence permeated these relationships. Domestic concerns were overshadowed by the threat of prison, exile, or execution. As Vera Broido noted in her memoirs, 'Mother was a good and loving mother when she was there... Most of the time she simply was not there, nor was Father.'[5] Party affiliation made no difference: Anna Yakimova and Olga Liubatovich (People's Will), Alexandra Kollontai and Inessa Armand (Bolshevik), and Eva Broido (Menshevik) all faced combinations of such challenges, whether they gave their children up or tried to keep the family united. The absence of love, real or perceived, irrevocably shaped their lives.

From the very beginning, the chauvinistic attitude toward wives and mothers in the underground dominated women's involvement. Ekaterina Breshkovskaya had run away from home in 1870 to join the anarchists working with the peasants. Her comrades frequently suggested that when she gained a husband and an estate she would discard her ideals. When marriage changed nothing, they insisted a baby would damper her radical fervor. The birth of her son in 1874 altered neither her beliefs nor her conviction, and she knew she needed to make a decision.

> My heart felt torn into a thousand pieces. [...] I knew that I could not be a mother and still be a revolutionist. Those were not two tasks to which

> it was possible to give a divided attention. [...] I was not the only one called upon to make such a sacrifice. Among the women in the struggle for Russian freedom there were many who chose to be fighters for justice rather than mothers of the victims of tyranny.[6]

Breshkovskaya is one of the earliest examples of a revolutionary woman who faced the double bind of social and radical expectation, and who found her desire to undertake work and motherhood in conflict. The pages describing her decision to give her son over to her brother and sister-in-law — along with the emotional turmoil this caused her — is the most time Breshkovskaya devotes to her son in her memoirs. Her choice, her rationale, and her pain are echoed through the generations of women who followed, and are worth bearing in mind.

Breshkovksaya became something of a mother to the women she met throughout her revolutionary career. One such was Anna Yakimova, arrested in 1882 for making the bombs which the terrorist group People's Will used to assassinate Tsar Alexander II. Yakimova was pregnant at the time of her arrest and gave birth to a boy whilst in prison, 'watching over him night and day to protect him from rats, trying to warm him with her breath and watching him slowly die as she ran out of milk'.[7] When she was sentenced to hard labor at the Kara mines, Yakimova knew it would be impossible to keep him. The journey north, on foot and by sledge, took two years; he would never survive. Knowing it was her son's only chance, she 'gave him over to some well-wishers who had come out to greet the prisoners with messages of support and tears of sympathy'.[8] She never saw him again. Whilst at Kara she met Breshkovskaya, by then a Socialist Revolutionary in exile for nearly a decade. No doubt Breshkovskaya provided consolation as well as solidarity. It was easier to bear the absence of children alongside women

with similar burdens, fighting the same cause, without judgement.

Olga Liubatovich was sixteen when she left home to become a doctor. Russian women weren't permitted into higher education, and so she studied in Zurich, a hotspot both for women's education and revolutionary activity; many who took up the socialist cause in the 1870s-1880s met there whilst studying science and medicine. Liubatovich became involved in such a circle, and returned to Russia to join People's Will.

Her memoirs give a glimpse into the dynamics and philosophy of the underground at the time, but deliberately obfuscate personal matters. She describes her first meeting with and impressions of Nikolay Morozov, the party's founder, and their mutual disillusionment with the movement's authoritarian turn. She records that they left for Geneva, but writes little of their time there until he returned to Russia and was promptly arrested.

> I nearly collapsed from grief. [...] I wasn't sufficiently careful when I walked into my room, and I woke up my baby daughter. Her crying finally brought me to my senses, and I calmed down and fed her. But what venom I must have given her along with the milk from my breast, when I would rather have been holding someone else![9]

These are the first indications that her feelings for Morozov extended deeper than friendship, and the first, surprisingly casual, mention of the child he fathered. As much as Liuboatovich tried to keep her memoir focused on her work and the movement, the depth of her love for them both made this impossible.

With Morozov in prison, Liubatovich returned to Russia to liberate him. The decision was devastating, and a

male comrade attempted to dissuade her on behalf of her daughter, but Liubatovich was adamant: 'I thought I'd be back; I didn't know, didn't want to believe that I was seeing my little girl for the last time. My heart was numb with grief.'[10] The only way Liubatovich could justify leaving her daughter behind was to convince herself that it was not permanent, but her writing indicates that this was more wishful thinking than firm conviction.

Once back in Russia, Liubatovich went to her father to draw from her funds. If she was expecting support or understanding, she was mistaken. Though her father was sympathetic to his daughter's aims, the sudden discovery that he had a grandchild who had been left in Geneva made him 'extremely upset':

> An intelligent and well-educated man, he naturally understood...that a child born of a mother living underground couldn't be legitimate, and he suffered, both for my sake and for the child's... [...] Now I understood...that I had to bear a double burden in life – the heavy burden of a human being and the burden of a woman as well...[11]

Liubatovich's burden of womanhood follows Breshkovskaya's: women's struggles were rooted in the social structuring of their biological function as child-bearers into carers, barring them from work by necessitating tremendous emotional and professional sacrifice.

The burden of care was soon lifted. Liubatovich's daughter died, a victim of the meningitis epidemic sweeping Europe. She described herself as 'numb from grief',[12] discussing external reactions, but devoting very little time to internal ones. Like Breshkovskaya, Liubatovich felt children were incompatible with a seditious lifestyle:

> Yes, it's a sin for revolutionaries to start a family. Men and women both must stand alone, like soldiers under a hail of bullets. But in your youth, you somehow forget that revolutionaries' lives are measured not in years, but in days and hours.[13]

Liubatovich, always vague when it came to personal matters, never explained just what her sin was. Loving, or getting close to others, thus creating risk, pain, and distraction from the work? Or selfishness, perhaps, to have wanted a family, or have tried to stretch her love — for Morozov, daughter, and revolution — too thin.

Alexandra Kollontai is one of the most famous women in Russian revolutionary history, and this makes her memoirs particularly interesting. Considering the span and breadth of activity in her life, it is surprisingly short and was heavily edited. And her son, whom she adored unequivocally, plays very little part. Kollontai's authorial and editorial decisions, particularly those revolving around her son, are directly correlated to her revolutionary activity and the political climate in which her memoirs were written.

Unlike so many women from a bourgeois background, Kollontai made a love match with a factory inspector and then raised her son Mikhail, or Misha, herself, without the aid of a nanny. She makes a special point of this in her writing, setting the stage for further deviations when she begins to feel stifled by the limitations and boredom inherent to this role. '[T]he happy life of a housewife and spouse became for me a "cage." More and more my sympathies…turned to the revolutionary working class of Russia.'[14] Kollontai wrote fiction, read widely, and was increasingly politically engaged; occupying herself solely with house and home was not an option. The drive to join the movement was relentless, and she recognized, like Breshkovskaya, Yakimova, and Liubatovich before her, that it was impossible to balance both jobs. She left her husband but

kept her son, only dabbling in the underground lest her activities endanger him. Kollontai was trying to live two lives, and struggling to make a success of either. By 1903, she accepted that Misha had to live with his father.

Misha is hardly mentioned again for the remainder of her memoirs. If we were to take this as a complete picture of her life we might think that her son hardly meant anything to her. Yet the context of the memoir is key: when Lenin's policies took a fanatical turn she was a key member of the Workers' Opposition Party, a fact which Stalin did not forget. Her autobiography was written in administrative exile as an ambassador whilst under constant threat of Stalin's purges. Within this context, we understand that her comparative silence on Misha is a conscious decision for his safety. From her letters and diaries over the years, we know her love for him was almost obsessive, constantly waging battle with her yearning for political work. She never fully reconciled herself with her decision to give him up, but compartmentalized her guilt, aided by her shrewd self-knowledge. Yet her conviction is not strong enough to be recorded in her memoirs, where she must appear ideologically and emotionally sound, clear-sighted, and unburdened by conflicts.

Conflict ruled Kollontai's inner world. Her search for a meaningful, genuine, loving connection with another man after her divorce and her deep love for Misha were both frustrated by her unwavering, uncompromising devotion to socialism. While she briefly notes this conundrum in her memoir, citing it as a universal struggle for women and a rationale for socialist/feminist emancipation, she gives no indication in this public presentation of the pain these decisions and conditions caused her. Rather, we see this elsewhere, in private letters. In the summer of 1917, Kollontai was working diligently and writing frequently to Misha to ensure he was safe in the capital rocked by revolutions, and even as the Bolsheviks were gearing up for continued offenses,

her mind was still on her son and the battle she had fought since 1903.

> Darling…I can't tell you how much I miss you and long to talk to you. I wanted to take a few days off to dash to Petrograd and visit you, but as soon as I got back to Moscow I was inundated with work for the women's congress. It's the same old story. My heart longs for you, but work holds me back. And so I must button myself up tight and not let my emotions get in the way.[15]

Her choice of words reveals her dilemma — when motherhood had been her primary responsibility, it held her back from work, and yet when she longed to take on maternal responsibility for Misha, work kept her from doing so. The last sentence in particular is revealing. Emotions, being unpredictable as well as personally and politically damaging, must be put away lest they interrupt or make impossible fulfilling, fruitful, public work.

Kollontai's great success in the party — the first woman in the Bolshevik cabinet and one of the first female ambassadors in history — not to mention her blind determination, helped balance all-consuming work and all-consuming motherhood with comparative ease. She recognized these dual impulses and the impossibility of their mutual fulfillment in the current society; her socialist ideals were built on a feminist foundation, campaigning to free herself and future generations of women from the pain of sacrificing either their professional or maternal instincts.

The difficulties of keeping a child whilst undertaking revolutionary work were as much emotional as practical: how to manage the emotional challenges as well as financial, geographical, and other concrete concerns. One of these is Inessa Armand, who in many ways offers an interesting foil to Kollontai. Her reputation as Lenin's mistress precedes her,

though it is her least impressive accomplishment. She was a dedicated socialist from a young age, and she was also a dedicated mother of five.

The difficulty of managing childcare and full-time work — revolutionary or otherwise — strengthened the feminist base of both Kollontai and Armand, particularly their calls for crèches and communal housing. Armand was significantly more torn than Kollontai about her conflicting roles; motherhood was not the centre of Kollontai's life, but had been for Armand for several years, quite happily. She wrote to a friend that the 'friction between personal and family interests and the interests of society…is one of the most serious problems facing the intelligentsia today'.[16] Here we see the beginning of her incorporation of motherhood and feminist issues into her political philosophy. She would follow this theme throughout her career.

Just because a revolutionary chose to keep her children with her does not mean she was always able to do so. Armand was often arrested and imprisoned and forcibly separated from her children, leaving them to the care of her husband's family. Elena Vlasova, friend and cellmate, said, 'She missed them infinitely but she never spoke of them. But we knew that all the embroidery and knitting was destined for them.'[17] There are echoes here of Kollontai, forcing herself to button up her emotions and put them to one side. What Armand could not express in words, she poured into acts of love for her children, gifts to keep them warm and comfortable in her absence. Parenting from a distance was a fact for nearly all revolutionary mothers at some point. Armand's letters to her children are tender, full of false cheer, laced throughout with concern for their physical and intellectual welfare. And always, her longing to be with them and see them grow well. But she could not bear to spend two years in exile without them, so she escaped from Siberia in 1908 and fled to Paris. There, she met Lenin.

Much has been written of her relationship with Lenin, and about the possible *ménage à trois* between them and Lenin's wife, Bolshevik Party secretary and lifelong socialist Nadezhda Krupskaya; to recount it here is superfluous. What is more curious, even than their salacious personal dynamic, is how Armand's children were incorporated into their domestic arrangement. When the children visited they stayed with their mother, and often with Lenin and Krupskaya, who were affectionate toward them. Krupskaya recalled that they occupied a prominent, if not predominant, place in their mother's thoughts: 'She told us a great deal about her life and…children; she showed me their letters and in speaking about them she seemed to radiate warmth and ardour.'[18] Within the safe company of her lover and his generous, childless wife, and able to bring her children over for frequent visits, she was able to speak truthfully of her love and longing for her children. She exerted a great deal of energy moving herself and her children around to keep the family comparatively together.

It is worth noting a key difference between Kollontai and Armand, who are so often compared in their aims and viewpoints but were typically at quiet loggerheads over methods and personality. As we have seen, Kollontai's work on feminist theory stemmed from her personal sense of being hemmed in by society's expectations of women, particularly of her class; although her writing aimed to erase the domestic (including romantic and maternal) bonds of womanhood across the classes, it was instigated by her personal discomfort in the limited roles assigned to her. Even her opposition to the war had a direct correlation to her private life. She had been a Menshevik, but her militant anti-war stance led her to join the Bolsheviks; one wonders if, in addition to recognising the political, economic, and social detriment of the war, her dread that Misha might enlist or be conscripted had something to do with her pacifism.

Armand's work on feminist issues, however, came as a direct result of her daughter Inna's questions about love, marriage, and sex.[19] As Armand replied to Inna's letters, advising her teenage daughter from a distance, she recognized the need and desire to address them to all young ladies asking the same questions. She had already synthesized her thoughts in letters; the next step was a pamphlet on feminist issues. In 1919 she became director of the Zhenotdel, or women's department, which she had established with Kollontai, and there was a sense in certain circles that Armand's leadership role was a direct result of her relationship with Lenin. But she worked at a frenetic pace for a year before quitting from strain, supplying maternal advice to all the daughters of Russia.

Armand was exhausted; she, like Kollontai, had become involved with Workers' Opposition, who considered many of Lenin's new policies damaging to the principles of their hard-won socialist revolution…yet she loved him still. The cognitive dissonance necessary to maintain these two conflicting pillars of her life nearly broke her. In her diary she recorded that the only things left in her life which meant anything to her were Lenin and her children.[20] Work and Lenin were one and the same; only her children were spared the deadening of her emotions. As they fled from warring factions during the Civil War, her concerns shifted from politics to her youngest child, as if she sensed she was running out of time to care for him. She, like her predecessors, found her position as woman and mother incompatible with her work; she also recognized, however, that maintaining a public persona of disinterest was untenable.

> I'm only worried for Andrushka, my little son. In this respect I am weak – not like a Roman matron who could easily sacrifice her children in the interest of the republic. I could not. I am terribly worried about my children. I was never a coward for myself, but I'm a big coward when it concerns my children, especially Andrushka. […]

> We are still very far from the time when the personal interest and that of society will coincide. Now there is no personal life because all our time and effort is devoted to the common cause. Or maybe other people can find a bit of time and a little corner of happiness. I don't know how to do it for myself.[21]

It was a weakness she could never have shared, particularly not with Lenin, and even if she had possessed the courage, she no longer had the will. These thoughts were a final glimpse at the conditions which had set up the great works of her life, an analysis of the historical context in which she had existed, with the conclusion that her feelings were inferior to those of her predecessors — not realising, due to their universal silence, that they were in fact equal. These women shared a relentless work ethic. Armand, who struggled to stop working at the best of times, was no different. Already weak, she contracted cholera at a committee meeting on the road and died days later. For the rest of their lives, Lenin and Krupskaya looked after Armand's children, protecting them from the political upheaval of the coming decades.

The memoir of Eva Broido is particularly interesting because they can be read alongside that of her daughter Vera, who became a scholar on her mother's predecessors in the People's Will. Eva Broido had two daughters from an unhappy marriage, Alexandra and Galina. When she discovered socialist theory she, like Kollontai, felt herself drawn irresistibly to the underground. After her divorce her mother Sara helped her look after the girls and eventually Daniel and Vera, two children from her second marriage, to Mark Broido, childhood friend and fellow revolutionary. Broido, like Liubatovich, Breshkovskaya, and Kollontai, writes little of her children in her memoirs, keeping her emotions about motherhood vague or hidden; unlike them, however, we have the words of her

daughter to fill in the gaps Broido left behind, and to give us insight into a revolutionary child's impressions and emotions.

Broido was in exile with her two daughters, newborn Daniel, her mother Sara, and Mark, who was later arrested and jailed for his role in a revolt. Worried he'd hang, Broido sent her mother and baby home. With her husband in jail and her mother gone, Broido, working full time as a pharmacist, needed a solution to the problem of childcare. Her answer was unorthodox:

> [O]n my way to work I took the little girls to the gate of the prison… Needless to say various notes and letters were carefully hidden in the belts and hems of their dresses. The children…were terribly spoiled by the comrades. […] Many years later, in St. Petersburg, one of my little girls was asked once where she liked it best and without hesitation she answered, 'in prison'.[22]

Crèche care was a common demand where socialism and feminism intersected. Kollontai especially called for it in theory, but Broido put it into practice, although in a surprising form and with the added seditious dimension of contraband in children's clothing. Similar scenarios played out in other families, in other eras, by women of other political parties. Barbara Evans Clements wrote of two other women, both Bolsheviks, who brought their children to prison with them,[23] although none of these children seem to have enjoyed the pampering afforded to Broido's.

When Mark escaped from exile Broido made arrangements for herself, first sending her daughters to her mother in Lithuania via the care of friends. She would spend months knowing nothing of her family as she moved from Siberia to Germany, and eventually England. But she could not keep still, and her return to Russia appears to again relegate her

children to her mother's care; for the next hundred pages of her memoir they disappear.

Her next reference to the children is a confession to having given up 'all work in the party and in the labour movement...unable to resume for three whole years, from the end of 1907 to the end of 1910'.[24] While Broido cites Mark's re-arrest and the pressure this put on her financially, the more likely cause was the unmentioned birth of her final child, Vera, on October 10, 1907. With three children and one newborn, even with her mother's help she could not have managed revolutionary work on top of her duties as mother. Such absences from activity were commonplace. According to Hillyar and McDermid, 'The existence of children generally becomes known from biographical accounts where female revolutionaries' absence from active political life was explained "as family circumstances".'[25]

Vera's relationships with her parents was fractured by their revolutionary activities, although they were consistently very loving. The distance between them was often emotional as well as physical, especially for the child. '[Mother] was so often away from home for long periods that I hardly noticed her absence,' Vera explains. 'Each time she seemed a stranger at first and I felt a bit shy of her but a good cry seemed to bring us together again.'[26] Certain feelings, such as love or relief, are acceptable within contexts such as reunions. Yet part of the distance Vera describes lay in Broido withholding less manageable emotions like fear and worry. This took a tremendous physical toll on her.

> I had not yet recovered from my sun- and air-less existence in prison [for opposing the war] and the emotional strain of parting from my relatives and friends. And I was worried about our future. [...] When I returned to our compartment in the train and looked at my children, my courage failed me, my feet gave away under me and I fell

> into a dead faint. [...] My children were terribly frightened. But I quickly recovered and I had myself under control from then on.[27]

Broido would never let her worries get the better of her, especially in front of her children. Emotionality, if not femininity, was a detriment to buttoning oneself up, or keeping oneself under control. We see links with Armand and Kollontai in her refusal to speak of maternal pain, as if to voice it were to be defeated by it.

In 1916 word came that Galina, Broido's second child, was ill with meningitis. Trapped in Siberia, Broido applied for leave to attend to her, but was refused, and Galina died. Like Liubatovich, the helplessness imposed by the many miles between her and her daughter added to her sense of loss. Vera recalled:

> I never saw Mother so shattered. She did not speak of it, did not share her grief with me, went about her work as usual, and I could only guess at her thoughts and feelings. Did she blame herself for having chosen a way of life that often took her away from her children, even when they needed her most? I suspected that she did, though I also thought that nothing would make her leave her chosen path. I sympathized... I had acquired a romantic admiration for political exiles... I thought it right that Mother should be just like the best of them.[28]

But for all the agony Broido suffered, she could no more record Galina's death for herself in memoirs than discuss it with Vera, and it is easy to understand her reluctance, particularly in light of the wedge it drove between herself and her eldest daughter. Alexandra was consumed by bitterness, declared that she hated all Mensheviks, and befriended Bolsheviks out of spite; she even married one.[29] Interestingly,

her revenge never consisted of abandoning the revolution; like Vera, she had absorbed her parents' revolutionary ethos. But she avoided the family, particularly her mother. Broido was supported by other exiles like Ekaterina Breshkovskaya, now known as the "little grandmother of the revolution". No doubt Breshkovskaya's presence was a great comfort; Breshkovskaya's son had no sympathy — in fact, open disdain — for her political work. Like Yakimova, Broido found solace in an empathetic comrade.

Among this family turmoil the revolution erupted, and the exiles returned home. After the Bolshevik coup in October the family was fragmented for years, and by 1920, remaining in Russia was impossible and Broido crossed the border with Vera to join Mark. This exile, a challenge for Broido, was a joy for Vera, who felt a part of a family for the first time. But Broido knew no rest; like Kollontai (indeed, like all of the women of the movement) it was simply not in her nature. She joined a Menshevik journal, and their home was soon the centre of an exiled Menshevik colony.

But this domestic idyll could not hold her indefinitely. In 1927 she announced to a baffled Mark and Vera that she was returning to Russia on behalf of the Mensheviks. It was meant to take six weeks, but she never came home. Broido was caught, spent three years in solitary confinement before being exiled to central Asia where 'she was allowed to receive just one visit, from [Alexandra]'.[30] Given the previous difficulties between mother and daughter, one wonders about their meeting, their conversation, and whether or not the gap was ever bridged. Broido was tried by a military tribunal and shot on September 14, 1941.

Women in the Russian revolutionary movement loved their children; such a statement is neither novel nor surprising. But to be a mother and a revolutionary required vastly disparate lifestyles, and the absence caused by one invariably hurt the other: either the work suffers, or the relationship

between mother and child does. In a movement where women already struggled for acceptance (even among the Bolsheviks who, with the help of staunch feminists Kollontai and Armand, were the first to recognize the value of the galvanized woman as a revolutionary force), women with children faced extra challenges. Memoirs were a space where women could control the narratives of their lives. In order to ensure they were viewed as worthwhile members of the movement, not distracted by personal concerns, they often avoided sharing their feelings about motherhood. This absence can at first seem callous, but when we read their narratives closely, we find it to be superficial: not only are children present, but also the interconnected emotions of love, guilt, and sadness as they make parenting decisions which most women of the intelligentsia never had to consider. Furthermore, we realise that such silence had been part of their daily lives, forcing down feelings which might threaten their capacity to work effectively and leaving them carrying great emotional burdens. Revolutionary women's personal lives, according to scholarly memory, are skewed toward sexual love rather than maternal connection, the former being more salacious and often involving prominent men. Yet in many ways their position as mothers is precisely what made them such key fighters in the movement: they sought to build a better, fairer society for the working class which included women's and children's specific needs.

Notes

[1] Barbara Evans Clements, *Bolshevik Women* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Anna Hillyar and Jane McDermid, *Midwives of Revolution* (London: UCL Press, 1999); Cathy Porter, *Fathers and Daughters: Russian Women in Revolution* (London: Virago, 1976); Vera Broido, *Apostles Into Terrorists* (London: Viking Press, 1977); and Anna Hillyar and Jane

McDermid, *Revolutionary Women in Russia, 1880-1917: A Study in Collective Biography* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).

[2] Barbara Alpern Engel, *Mothers and Daughters: Women of the Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 23.

[3] For further discussion on women's lives and society, see Richard Stites' *The Women's Liberation in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860-1930* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[4] Engel, p. 12.

[5] Vera Broido, *Daughter of Revolution: A Russian Girlhood Rememebred* (London: Constable, 1998), p. 27-28.

[6] Catherine Breshkovsky, *The Little Grandmother of the Russian Revolution: Reminiscences and Letters of Catherine Breshkovsky*, ed. by Alice Stone Blackwell (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1919), p. 39-40.

[7] Cathy Porter, *Fathers and Daughters: Russian Women in Revolution* (London: Virago, 1976), p. 278.

[8] Ibid., p. 278.

[9] Olga Liubatovich, 'Olga Liubatovich'. *Five Sisters: Women Against the Tsar, the memoirs of five young anarchist women of the 1870's*, trans. and ed. by Barbara Alpern Engel and Clifford N. Rosenthal (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1975), pp. 143-201 (p. 181).

[10] Ibid., p. 182-183.

[11] Ibid., p. 193.

[12] Ibid., p. 196.

[13] Ibid., p. 196.

[14] Alexandra Kollontai, *The Autobiography of a Sexually Emancipated Communist Woman*, trans. by Salvator Attansio, ed. by Iring Fetscher (New York: Schocken, 1975), p. 11.

[15] Porter, p. 322.

[16] Michael Pearson, *Inessa: Lenin's Mistress* (London: Duckworth, 2001), p. 46.

[17] Pearson, p. 52.

[18] Robert H. McNeal, *Bride of the Revolution: Krupskaya and Lenin* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1972), p. 140.

[19] Pearson, p. 127.

[20] Ibid., p. 214.

[21] Ibid., p. 215.

[22] Eva Broido, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, trans. and ed. by Vera Broido (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 47.

[23] Barbara Evans Clements, *Bolshevik Women* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 89.

[24] Eva Broido, p. 138.

[25] Anna Hillyar and Jane McDermid, *Revolutionary Women in Russia, 1880-1917: A Study in Collective Biography* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 15.

[26] Vera Broido, p. 42.

[27] Eva Broido, p. 144.

[28] Vera Broido, pp. 70-71.

[29] Ibid., p. 71.

[30] Ibid., p. 210.

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